Preamble

The House met at Eleven of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

NEW WRIT.

For the Borough of West Ham (Upton Division) in the room of Alfred James Chotzner, esquire (Manor of Northstead).—[Captain Margesson.]

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Southern Railway Bill,

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

Orders of the Day — MARRIAGE ACT (1889) AND FOREIGN MARRIAGE ACT (1892) AMENDMENT BILL.

Order for Consideration of Lords Amendments read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Lords Amendments be now considered."—[Mr. Brocklebank.]

11.8 a.m.

Mr. CHARLES WILLIAMS: I should like to know what is the exact position of the House on this matter. Here we are on a Friday morning, only a few privileged select persons, and we are asked to consider these Amendments without knowing what they are and what their bearing is. It is a very important Bill—marriage goes to the whole root of family life—and it is not a matter that should be dealt within this way. The Bill has had very little discussion. It is not a contentious measure, but one which nearly everyone of us wants to see pased into law and here we are having thrown at us certain Amendments from another place. We have no proper means of knowing what they are, and we are asked to discuss them in the air, just having them read out to us. I should like to ask for some explanation. There must be someone in authority, whether the Parliamentary Secretary or one of the Law Officers. I think we ought to be told the exact position of the House before we enter into any discussion of the matter. It is quite common form for some explanation to be made why it is necessary to accept the Lords Amendments as a whole before we come to detailed consideration of them. As a humble private Member who does not take very much part in these Debates, I feel myself in a state of confusion, and I ask for this information if someone will give it to me.

11.10 a.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: I want to join for once with the hon. Member in this very important issue. I follow probably as much as most Members of the House the

procedure adopted in carrying Measures through into Acts of Parliament, and I am in a difficulty, and the whole of the Opposition is in a difficulty, in knowing to-day exactly where we stand. Here is a Bill that alters the hours during which marriages may be solemnized. I went to the Vote Office on Tuesday last and got a copy of the Bill, and I understood then that there were Amendments coming from another place. I have asked several times for them, but have not been able to get them yet. I have an impression that they will be read out from the Table this morning, and I do not think the House ought to be treated in that way. I protest against this method of bringing Amendments from another place to us. There has been ample time to print them and to let us have them in the usual way. When the Government wants any documents printed, it is done within a few hours. The Unemployment Bill as amended in the Commons up to about eleven o'clock one night was printed and reached our addresses at 8 o'clock on the following morning. Consequently, it cannot be a problem of printing, and it cannot be a problem so far as the administrative staff of the Parliament Houses are concerned. There is something sinister behind all this.

The Government have already adopted several dictatorial methods against the Opposition, and we are very much afraid that there is something secret, something-deep, something fundamental in the Government's declining to let us have these Amendments. The Bill has never been discussed at all in this House yet. Not a word has been said by way of argument in favour of it. I hope that the Attorney-General's voice when he speaks will tally with that of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health. Their speeches on occasion do not agree on party politics, but on this Bill I think they ought to have a unanimous voice and explain this difficulty with which we are met.

Question put, "That the Lords Amendments be now considered."

The House divided: Ayes, 45; Noes, 15.

Lords Amendments considered accordingly.

CLAUSE 2.—(Extent of Act.)

Lords Amendment: In page 1, line 15, after "Act," insert:
except in so far as it amends the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."—[Mr. Brocklebank.]

11.20 a.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: When we raised a protest a moment or two ago and asked for some information from the Treasury Bench as to what these Amendments meant, we did not have a reply at all. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman representing the Minister of Health will not be so discourteous as not to explain to us what these Amendments actually mean. We cannot possibly understand them merely by having them read from Chair, and, therefore, the Attorney-General, or the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health, ought to explain to the House exactly what each of the Amendments implies. The Bill is, I think, a very reasonable measure, although we have never had it discussed on the Floor of the House of Commons. The Bill says that in future marriages shall be solemnized in this country between the hours of eight o'clock in the morning—

Mr. SPEAKER: I would remind the hon. Member that this is not a Second Reading Debate.

Mr. DAVIES: We ought to have an explanation at any rate as to what the Amendment actually means. I do not want to offend the hon. Gentleman, but
I doubt whether he himself knows what it means yet. When he has had time to study the Amendment, perhaps he will have the courtesy to tell the House what the Amendment actually means in relation to the Bill.

11.21 a.m.

Mr. BROCKLEBANK: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. B. Davies) is so frequently on his feet that I must apologise to him that I did not get the opportunity of explaining the Amendment before he had jumped up and had reached the Box. The Amendment is really a very simple one. It is a technical Amendment, and I am very much obliged to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health for his careful scrutiny of this Bill and for finding out that it might give offence to some parties if the Amendment were not accepted. The Bill itself does not apply to Scotland, but it was pointed out in another place that the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, provides a procedure under which British subjects may be validly married in foreign countries. It states in Section 8 of that Act that the marriages should be solemnized between eight in the forenoon and three in the afternoon. The present Bill substitutes 6 p.m. for the 3 p.m. contained in this Section, so that, assuming that the Bill becomes law, if a person domiciled in England wishes to be married in France, at, say, five o'clock, the marriage will be valid. And the framers of the Bill, of course, intend this to apply to all British subjects.

Mr. R. DAVIES: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. You were good enough to call me to order for doing exactly what the hon. Gentleman is now doing.

Mr. SPEAKER: I do not think that the hon. Member can find fault with me on that point. The hon. Member for Fairfield (Mr. Brocklebank) is trying to explain the actual Amendment before the House. He is not making a Second Reading speech.

Mr. BROCKLEBANK: With regard to the domicile of the man in England no question arises, but, if a man domiciled in Scotland or Northern Ireland asked to be married in, say, France, at five o'clock, some question might arise as to whether the marriage were legal or not. Therefore, I repeat that I am very much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Health for suggesting in another place these very simple words which make it quite certain that were that question to arise, a marriage in France, or Spain, or in any other foreign country would be valid up to six o'clock for all British subjects.

11.24 a.m.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: The position is remarkably awkward. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Fairfield (Mr. Brocklebank) has very carefully explained the position as far as he understands it, but he is not a Scottish Member nor is he a law officer. The Amendment, as far as I understand it, is to safeguard the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, so that a Scotsman can get married in France up to six o'clock in the afternoon. That is the whole point of the Amendment as far as I am able to understand it. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about Northern Ireland?"] I wish to deal with Scotland first. I am not sure whether other Amendments may not deal with Northern Ireland. We do not know the position yet. It is wrong that we as English Members should abrogate to ourselves the laying down of Amendments of this kind on a Friday morning as far as Scotland is concerned.
There is no Scottish Law Officer present representing the Scottish Office, and there is no Scottish Member in the House. There is, however, one representative of Scotland here, the Minister of Mines, but he comes from Torquay. He obviously knows the question inside
out. With his great knowledge of procedure, his great knowledge of Scottish law and his great knowledge of marriage, he might explain to the House whether it is really the desire of Scottish people that they should be able to marry in France up to six o'clock in the evening. No Scotsman has ever approached me on the subject. I have had no letters on the point. On behalf of some of my friends in Scotland, I do not think it is right that we should deal with this matter purely on the experience of English Members. I think I approve of the Amendment, certainly I wish to approve of it, but I must have an explanation of it and not allow it to go through in any harum scarum way. We all appreciate what the hon. Member for the Fairfield Division of Liverpool (Mr. Brocklebank) has done in regard to the Bill, and we appreciate the clear statement that he has made, but we would like to understand the matter better. We know that the Minister of Mines is so generous that he always likes to draw on his great fund of knowledge. Perhaps he will help us in the matter. There in no other Scottish Liberal Member present, and no Scottish Socialist Member has come to the help of Scotland in this time of trouble.

11.27 a.m.

Major HARVEY: We are in a difficulty in not having the Lords Amendments before us. There is one particular point in regard to the Amendment on which I should like some explanation, and I should like to know whether it has been considered. It has not yet been possible to fix summer time in this country the same as in other countries, and there may be a Scotsman who will find himself with more hours in France during two or three weeks in the year during which he could marry, as a result of the difference in summer time. It may be desirable that that should be so, but we ought to have some explanation either from the Parliamentary Secretary or from the hon. Member in charge of the Bill as to what the position would be in that case.

Question put, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."

The House divided: Ayes, 54; Noes, 14.

Division No. 218.]
AYES.
[11.12 a.m.


Balfour. Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)
Crooke, J. Smedley
Galbraith, James Francis Wallace


Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)
Grimston, R. V.


Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A. (Birm., W.)
Denman, Hon. R. D.
Hacking. Rt. Hon. Douglas H.


Clayton, Sir Christopher
Elmley, Viscount
Hudson. Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)


Copeland, Ida
Erskine, Lord (Weston-super-Mare)
Hunt, Sir Gerald B.


Inskip, Rt. Hon. sir Thomas W. H.
North, Edward T.
Spens, William Patrick


James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.
Palmer, Francis Noel
Tate, Mavis Constance


Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Pike, Cecil F.
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles


Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Rathbone, Eleanor
Turton, Robert Hugh


Lumley, Captain Lawrence R.
Rickards, George William
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


McConnell, Sir Joseph
Ropner, Colonel L.
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)


Maitland, Adam
Rosbotham, Sir Thomas
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Runge, Norah Cecil
Withers, Sir John James


Mayhew, Lieut-Colonel John
Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart



Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—


Moss, Captain H. J.
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)
Mr. Brocklebank and Major S. E. Harvey.


NOES.


Attlee, Clement Richard
Foot, Dingle (Dundee)
Lunn, William


Cape, Thomas
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)
Smith, Tom (Normanton)


Daggar, George
Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)



Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Edwards, Charles
Leckie, J. A.
Mr. Banfield and Mr. Tinker.

Division No. 219.]
AYES.
[11.30 a.m.


Acland, Rt. Hon. sir Francis Dyke
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Ropner, Colonel L.


Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.
Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.
Rosbotham, Sir Thomas


Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)
James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.
Runge, Norah Cecil


Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)
Knight, Holford
Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart


Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Lock wood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.


Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)


Clayton, Sir Christopher
McConnell, Sir Joseph
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.


Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.
Magnay, Thomas
Spens, William Patrick


Copeland, Ida
Maitland, Adam
Tate, Mavis Constance


Crooke, J. Smedley
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles


Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil]
May hew, Lieut-Colonel John
Turton, Robert Hugh


Denman, Hon. R. D.
Meller, Sir Richard James
Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Erskine, Lord (Weston-super-Mars)
Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


Foot, Dingle (Dundee)
Moss, Captain H. J.
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)


Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
North, Edward T.
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Grimston, R. V.
Palmer, Francis Noel
Withers, Sir John James


Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
Pike, Cecil F.



Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Rathbone, Eleanor
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—


Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Rickards, George William
Mr. Brocklebank and Sir Gerald Hurst




NOES.


Attlee, Clement Richard
Edwards, Charles
McEntee, Valentine L.


Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)
Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Smith, Tom (Normanton)


Cape, Thomas
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth, Pontypool)



Daggar, George
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)
Leckie, J. A.
Mr. Banfield and Mr. Tinker.


Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Lunn, William

CLAUSE 3.—(Short Title.)

Lords Amendment: In page 1, line 18, at the end, insert:
and this Act and the Marriage Acts, 1811 to 1932, may be cited together as the Marriage Acts, 1811 to 1934; and this Act and the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, may be cited together as the Foreign Marriage Acts, 1892 and 1934.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment."—[Mr. Brocklebank.]

11.36 a.m.

Mr. R. DAVIES: I hope the hon. Member will now stand up and explain exactly what all this means.

Mr. BROCKLEBANK: It is a purely drafting Amendment and is introduced merely for the convenience of citation. With that very full explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) will be satisfied.

Mr. DAVIES: I am not. I think that the hon. Member should be fair to the House. We have never had an explanation as to what all these Acts of Parliament, which are cited, mean. What does this Bill do, and in what way does it affect the law as it now stands?

11.38 a.m.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: I want to say a few words on what is called a citation Amendment. Like every one else, I have not a copy of the Lords Amendments,
but I have had the privilege of looking at a copy of this Amendment. In the first place, it cites the Marriage Act of 1811. That is quite a long time ago, and during all the years since then all sorts of things have happened. We come down here to-day, find all these Acts cited, and are asked to pass a law based on citation. The hon. and learned Member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight), who is usually bursting to explain things on a Friday afternoon, will check me if I am wrong—

Mr. HOLFORD KNIGHT: You will find it in the Library.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I am very sorry, but I do not know what is the matter with me. That is the first thing we are asked to decide, but no one has given any explanation, and here we are citing an Act which is over 100 years old. As a small illustration, it is a perfect example of the way in which we ought not to do our business. We are citing a whole lot of Acts which go back for 100 years. You might as well cite Acts of Parliament which are much older, but in any case how is a Scotsman or an Englishman who wishes to get married to get hold of the Act of 1811 and be sure that he is all right.? It is very difficult. Then we wander on to an Act of 1832, also over 100 years old. Here are two Acts of Parliament, both over 100 years old, which are cited. Think of all the speeches which many hon. Members have made,
brilliant speeches, about legislation by reference. Then you come a little nearer and you get an Act of 1834, and afterwards an Act of 1892. I am not quite sure, but at any rate there are six or seven old Statutes which are cited, and we are being asked this morning to insert them in this part of the Bill. The hon. Member as far as he could gave an explanation of the matter, and I am sure that the House will appreciate the immense trouble that he has taken. I do not ask him to read out all these Acts of Parliament on this occasion, but there is at least one which is vital to our argument. It is time some private Member should say that when a private Member's Bill is brought in it should be fairly clear what is meant to be done. It is indeed time that the legal authorities of the Government brought our laws into order, so that on an important question such as marriage—

Mr. DINGLE FOOT: The Attorney-General is present—

Mr. WILLIAMS: I am coming to him in a moment—we should have the fullest legal authority on the matter. The Attorney-General, as the hon. Member says, is present. His knowledge of the English law is undoubtedly very great, and I believe he has some knowledge of

the law of Scotland. He may not officially call himself learned but he has a wide experience, and if no one else in the House is able to relieve our minds and tell us exactly what we are doing, I appeal to the Attorney-General, to give us the full benefit of his immense wisdom and learning. I should like to apologise to the hon. Member in charge of the Bill for giving him any trouble in the matter. I have a great regard for his convictions and feelings, and for the valuable work he is doing, and any protest I may make has nothing personal in it. It is simply a duty, which I think should be done in the House of Commons, to protest against a citation of this kind which violates all the best principles of legislation in the House of Commons and all the best feelings of democracy. It is also calculated to give a lot of extra fees to lawyers, which is equally bad. All good lawyers want to simplify the law, and, that being the case, I feel sure that we ought to have a real authoritative pronouncement from some member of the legal profession to clear the matter up once and for all in the official language of the House of Commons.

Question put, "That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment".

The House divided: Ayes, 60; Noes, 16.

Division No. 220.]
AYES.
[11.44 a.m.


Acland, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Dyke
Harvey, Majors. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Rathbone, Eleanor


Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Rickards, George William


Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)
Hume, Sir George Hopwood
Ropner, Colonel L.


Bailey, Eric Alfred George
Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.
Rosbotham, Sir Thomas


Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)
Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)
Runge, Norah Cecil


Broadbent, Colonel John
James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.
Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart


Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Knight, Holford
Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.


Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)


Castlereagh, Viscount
Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.


Clayton, Sir Christopher
McConnell, Sir Joseph
Spens, William Patrick


Copeland, Ida
Magnay, Thomas
Tate, Mavis Constance


Crooke, J. Smedley
Maitland, Adam
Turton, Robert Hugh


Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Denman, Hon. R. D.
Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


Erskine, Lord (Weston-super-Mare)
Meller, Sir Richard James
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)


Foot, Dingle (Dundee)
McIson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
Moreing, Adrian C
Withers, Sir John James


Grimston, R. V.
Moss, Captain H. J.
Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)


Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
North, Edward T.



Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Palmer, Francis Noel
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—


Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Pike, Cecil F.
Mr. Brocklebank and Sir Gerald Hurst.




NOES.


Attlee, Clement Richard
Edwards, Charles
Leckie, J. A.


Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)
George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)
Lunn, William


Cape, Thomas
Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
McEntee, Valentine L.


Daggar, George
Griffiths, T. (Monmouth. Pontypool)
Smith, Tom (Normanton)


Davies, David L. (Pontypridd)
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)



Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Lawson, John James
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—




Mr. Banfield and Mr. Tinker.

INHERITANCE (FAMILYPROVISION) BILL (changed from "POWERS OF DISINHERITANCE BILL").

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

NEW CLAUSE.—(Savings.)

Nothing in this Act or in any order made thereunder shall—

(a) affect the rights of any creditor of a testator; or
(b) affect the rights of any person in relation to property of a testator which is undisposed of by his will and is not the subject of a donatio mortis causa.—[The Attorney-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

11.52 a.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir Thomas Inskip): I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time".
This is a Clause which, I think, ought to be added to the Bill. It provides that no order may be made under the Act and that nothing in the Act shall affect the rights of any creditor or testator, or the rights of any person in relation to property of a testator which is not disposed of by the will of the testator and is not a subject of a donatio mortis causa. Hon. Members who are responsible for the Bill will realise that I submit this addition to their Bill in an earnest desire to put the Bill in as proper form as I can; but I also wish to make it plain that the Bill is not a Government Bill and is not my Bill. I have undertaken a great deal of work in connection with the Bill, work which it really was not my duty to do. The hon. Gentleman who is in charge of the Bill, I think, perhaps will say that it is not his real child but only his adopted child. The hon. Gentleman has been most helpful to me and most obliging. In fact, my only complaint is that he has taken almost too readily anything that I put before him, until I found myself in a somewhat ambiguous position. But I wish to make my position perfectly plain at the earliest moment.
Although I offer these technical Amendments to the House for their consideration, it must be made quite plain that I do not take the responsibility for seeing that every question that may be raised by the Bill has been provided for. I have moved this new Clause because this was
something which seemed to me to stare one in the face when the Bill emerged from Committee. Everyone will agree that it would be quite improper for the rights of a creditor against an estate to be defeated by an order which might be made by the court after the death of the testator in pursuance of this Act. I do not suppose that the hon. Gentleman will object to that proposal.
I should say a few words in explanation of the second part of the new Clause. The way in which that will operate is this: A person might by his will dispose of half his property to a complete stranger and as to the other half make no disposition at all under the will. In accordance with the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, that property undisposed of under the will would go as Parliament has directed, to the next-of-kin—the widow or husband as the case might be or to the children if any. In other words that part of the property undisposed of would be distributed to the next-of-kin—the surviving spouse and the children if any—in the proportions settled by Parliament. The intention of this part of the Clause is to provide that no high court judge or county court judge shall have power, by an order made under this Measure, to interfere with the proportions which Parliament has thought proper to lay down in regard to the apportionment of the undisposed of part of the estate of a deceased person among the next-of-kin.

11.56 a.m.

Sir JOHN WARD LAW-MILNE: All those associated with the promotion of this Bill have every cause to be thankful, indeed deeply grateful, to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General for his help. While giving that help he has made it perfectly plain, as he did to the House this morning, that the Bill is not his Bill and that he is merely anxious, if it is to be passed at all, that it should be a workmanlike Measure. This proposed new Clause, is, I think, the result of an undertaking which he gave to the Committee upstairs that he would consider these points, and, if necesary, bring for-word a suitable form of words to deal with them. My right hon. and learned Friend has twitted me with being rather too amiable in the manner in which I have received his assistance. I think the House would
only expect me to receive with gratitude the Attorney-General's assistance in a matter of this kind. This is a Bill dealing entirely with points of law and those in charge of it could not fail to appreciate the value of the assistance which has been given not only by my right hon. and learned Friend but by other hon. and learned Members. This New Clause and the New Clause which is to be moved later, as far as I can follow them, deal satisfactorily with the points which the Attorney-General undertook to consider and I shall be very glad to accept them.

11.58 a.m.

Mr. TURTON: The New Clause states that nothing in this Act or any order made thereunder is to affect the rights of any creditor of a testator. What would be the position if the surviving spouse or child were a creditor of the testator? Would he or she have a double right first as a creditor and secondly under Clause 1 of the Bill, as not being mentioned in the will? There are cases, not only of ordinary debts but also of jointure charges, wherein a wife may be the creditor of her husband who is the testator. Because she is a creditor the testator takes particular care not to mention her in his will. In order to meet such a case as that, would the Attorney-General consider inserting after the word "creditor" in paragraph (a) the words "other than a spouse or child who is not benefiting under the will." I do not wish to delay the consideration of the new Clause but that appears to be a point of some substance and if there is any doubt about the matter it could be altered in another place. Everybody wants to see a surviving spouse or children not provided for under a will, receiving proper consideration according to the terms of the Bill but not if he or she is already entitled as an ordinary creditor or under a jointure.

12 n.

Mr. GALBRAITH: There is one small point which arises on paragraph (b) of the proposed new Clause. The proposed new Clause provides that nothing in the Act is to affect the rights of any person in relation to the property of a testator which is undisposed of by his will. That of course means that if a testator has made a will disposing of part of his property but leaving another part undisposed
of, then his next-of-kin will get a certain benefit. But Clause 1 of the Bill provides that, if a testator has not by his will made reasonable provision for the maintenance of a spouse or child the court can make such provision as it thinks reasonable for such spouse or child. I suppose that when the court considers whether or not a testator by his will has made reasonable provision, the court will probably take into account the fact that in an instance such as I have given, the spouse or child is already taking some part of the property under intestacy. That ought to be made perfectly plain.

12.2 p.m.

Sir JOHN WITHERS: With great deference I think both these points are answered by reference to Sub-section (2) of Clause 1 of the Bill which provides that the court shall on any application for any allowance consider
any other matter or thing which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant or material in relation to the applicant.
I think the fact that the applicant was a creditor of the testator or the fact that the applicant was already taking some benefit in another way, are certainly relevant matters which the court would take into consideration.

12.3 p.m.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) referred to the question of a jointure and we are told that that point is covered by Sub-section (2) of Clause 1. Here we have two lawyers, with considerable knowledge of the Bill, holding different opinions on this matter. I personally intend to vote for the proposed new Clause as it stands because I have confidence in the Attorney General—

Viscountess ASTOR: Hear, hear.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I hope that my noble Friend the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) will also be able to give it her support. While my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) has accepted the proposed New Clause we ought to be told whether the Government are going to vote for it. The original speech of the Attorney-General did not make that clear. Ordinary laymen are bound to accept the best legal advice
and we have had it from the Attorney-General and I am prepared to support the new Clause, provided the Attorney-General himself intends to vote for it.

Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time" put, and agreed to.

Clause added to the Bill.

NEW CLAUSE.—(Application of Act.)

This Act shall not apply in the case of a testator dying before the Commencement of this Act.—[The Attorney-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

12.6 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I beg to move, "That the Clause be read a Second time"
This second new Clause which I am offering to the House provides for the commencement of the Bill when it becomes law. At present there is nothing to say, or at any rate there is nothing clear to say, when precisely it will come into operation. It is dealt with in Clause 6 after a fashion, where the expression "testator" is defined in a particular way, but I do not think it is quite satisfactory in that form. It is much better that everybody should understand when the Bill is to come into operation. I am bound to say that I have had a great number of letters, as no doubt my hon. Friend opposite in charge of the Bill has, from people whose expectations have been raised very high indeed by this Bill. I have been asked to give directions that the Bill shall apply to estates which were subject to testamentary disposition as long ago as the nineties of the last century, but I have informed my correspondents that, although I have a great many powers, they are not so far-reaching as that, and I have told them that they had much better communicate with my hon. Friend opposite, who would perhaps put it into his Bill. Subject to any proposal of that sort, I suggest if only in order to give the House an opportunity of considering when the Bill should begin, that it should be made not to apply in the case of any testator who may have died before the Bill receives the Royal Assent. I do not know whether my hon. Friend agrees with me or not on that point.

12.8 p.m.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: In my ignorance I should have thought the Clause to which my right hon. And
learned Friend has referred, namely, Clause 6, made it perfectly clear that the Bill as an Act would not apply until the end of the present year. If he, however, with his very much greater knowledge, is in a position to tell the House that his Clause is necessary, I have nothing to say. To my lay mind it seems unnecessary, but I am prepared to accept it on the statement of the Attorney-General that it is necessary. I would only add that I am very pleased to hear that my right hon. and learned Friend has asked his correspondents to send their suggestions to me. I can tell him that the one suggestion to which he referred, with regard to the nineties, has not yet reached me, but I have had many requests to bring the Bill into operation, in such a way that it would deal with estates which were closed at least 20 years ago, so that my experience is very similar to that of my right hon. and learned Friend, and the amount of correspondence to which it has given rise is very great indeed.

12.9 p.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: It is very difficult for a layman to enter into a legal argument, but I always understood that no Act of Parliament could be made retrospective, and I think this Clause is reasonable from that angle. Having said that, I always thought the hon. Gentleman who is responsible for this Bill wanted a Measure of this kind to be passed into law in order to remove hardships that prevailed at the moment. Unless I am mistaken, this Bill was brought before Parliament because of certain hardships that exist now, and it seems to me, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman is once again too ready to accept the opinion of the learned Attorney-General. I do not mind the opinions of the right hon. and learned Gentleman on law, but on politics I do not think we should accept them.
I would ask the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill whether it is not a fact that the hardships which brought this Bill into being will still remain among us in spite of the passing of this Measure. I should have thought that at any rate the Bill might be made retrospective to a given date, say, for one or two years in order to clear up those cases. This is a private Member's Bill, and we are all entitled
to give our opinions on it, but I do not know whether it is too late to ask the learned Attorney-General to consider whether it is possible not to make the Bill retrospective for 20 or 30 years. There are one or two cases on record which are really very terrible in this connection, and I should have thought the Government would have made the Bill retrospective just to include them.

12.12 p.m.

Sir J. WITHERS: I think the last speaker has not quite considered what he said, because the Bill deals with the distribution of estates, and although we lawyers are very slow, we have not held up the distribution of estates for five or six years if we could avoid it. What has happened is that such estates have already been divided up in accordance with the wishes of the testators. It would be very nice to make this retrospective, but in that case you would have to call in all these estates, and the executors would have to redistribute them according to the terms of this Measure.

Mr. DAVIES: Does the hon. Member mean to say that the estate of a rich man who died two months ago will have been cleared up already by the lawyers?

Sir J. WITHERS: Not two months ago, but I understood the hon. Member to say some years ago. The Bill might be made to refer back, say, to the beginning of this year, but that is not the evil which I understood he wishes to cure. He wishes to cure some cases in which estates have been distributed already, unjustly as he thinks. It is not a practical suggestion that where an estate has already been distributed, you should call it back and redistribute it.

12.13 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: This Bill introduces an extraordinary principle into the jaw of this country. A man who leaves money has the right to the disposal of it, but the whole question only applies to a very small section of the community, because I regret to say that the majority of the population die without leaving any money behind them at all. My father used to say that the greatest endowment a father could give to his son was to throw him entirely on his own resources, and that he then always made good,
whereas once he got a substantial portion it was another matter. As an hon. Member said the other day about great expectations, those who were waiting for dead men's shoes had great difficulty in making good. I remember a very distinguished professional secretary with a very large business, and I commented upon the capacity of a young man who was doing some work for him in which I was interested. He replied, "He has the advantage that he is the son of a gentleman, and he has not got a penny in the world. It is a rigid rule in this office that we never take a young man in whose father has any money, because you can never get any work out of such a young man." The fact has always impressed me that it is a very difficult thing for wealthy people to bring up their children.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. and learned Member's remarks are very interesting, but they are not related to the Clause before the House.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I will come to the Bill.

Viscountess ASTOR: May I say to the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is difficult but not impossible to bring up your children to work, even if they have a wealthy home.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I bow to the opinion which the noble lady has expressed. I agree that it is difficult; almost impossible is nearly the same thing as impossible, and when the noble Lady and I are in agreement on one of these occasions, it must make both of us doubt whether we can possibly be right. This Bill is for the purpose of altering a man's testimentary dispositions. We have had some experience of that in Scotland—

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. and learned Member is not speaking to the Clause, which deals with the case of a testator dying before the commencement of the Act.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I am sorry; I was late in coming in. I thought it was the question of the passing of the Bill. I hope that I shall have an opportunity of resuming my speech later.

12.18 p.m.

Mr. TURTON: Might I ask the learned Attorney-General to reconsider the
Clause? So far as I understand what is intended, at a later point he is going to delete the interpretation at the beginning of Clause 6. As there is no other definition as to when this Bill comes into force, will not the effect be to make the Bill come into force earlier than my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) intended? Much as we like the provisions of the Bill, there are a great many administrative and legal difficulties involved. Is it a wise thing to make this Bill suddenly come into force, probably about Whitsuntide? Would it not be far wiser to make it operate from the beginning of January, 1935? I maintain that there is a parallel in my Bill, which was introduced last year—the Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Bill—which was passed at the same time of the year that this Bill is evidently going to be passed, and did not come into operation till January. Surely, the revolution in practice is much greater in this Bill than it was in that Bill. That is one consideration I would ask the learned Attorney-General to consider about this Clause.
There is another consideration. My hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster defines the word "testator" in the Bill. If we follow the suggestion of the learned Attorney-General to take out that definition there will be no definition in the Bill. The promoter had some very good reason for defining "testator," because he wishes to put something in as to an intestator. I think the word "testator" is rather a mistake in this Bill. For those reasons I would ask the House to consider carefully before they agree to this Clause, the very great difficulty in carrying it out, for I am sure my right hon. and learned Friend will agree with me that this Bill is not an easy Measure to carry out, and probably a most expensive one. Therefore, I think it most unwise for the House to accept this Clause unless we get some assurance that the Act will not come into force until 1st January, 1935, and I hope that there will be, either in this House or when the Bill goes to another place, an adequate definition of the word "testator" which will include all the conditions my hon. Friend the promoter included in his original Bill.

12.22 p.m.

Mr. MAITLAND: I am always interested, and I am sure the House is, when the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) intervenes in our Debates. He is amusing and entertaining Perhaps he is most effective when he is entertaining, but I hope that the House will not assume that this is a Bill in which only legal Members should take part. At least one or two hon. Members who, like myself, are not connected with the law, are taking an interest in this Measure, and I hope that other hon. Members will show interest and take part in the various matters which are raised. Of course, we always have a certain diffidence in attempting to intervene in debates which are couched in purely legal terms. I would like to refer to the suggestion of the hon. Member opposite first of all to make legislation retrospective. That is a dangerous principle.
Might I look at his suggestion from another point of view—that of an accountant. It is of course, well known that accountants have a great deal to do with the distribution of estates. My hon. Friend with, perhaps, some justification, referred to the reputation that members of the legal profession have that they are dilatory or wanting in the quality of acceleration. Speaking from an accountant's point of view, I hope that the same charge cannot be made with justification against accountants. I would point out that there are many cases where an estate is distributed within a very few months, and if the hon. Member's suggestion that there should be retrospective legislation were put into force, it would, in practice and in fact, create serious difficulties. In trying to cover one or two exceptional cases, he would also cover a large number of other estates, including smaller estates, which have been distributed, and where it would be utterly impossible for the assets to be followed. I, therefore, hope that he will not press his suggestion, although I appreciate the significance of it.
The suggestion of the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), that the date upon which the Bill should come into operation should be a later date than that suggested by the learned Attorney-General, is, I think, worthy of
consideration. There are serious objections to certain parts of this Measure. There is an objection. to the fact that a small estate might be the subject of litigation which is entirely outside the scope and intention of the promoters of the Bill. It is therefore very important before any measure of this kind is put into operation that there should be a reasonable time in order that the public can be informed exactly what the Measure is intended to do. I therefore support with pleasure my hon. Friend and hope the date will be some date later than December, 1934, and certainly not before.

12.25 p.m.

Mr. MOLSON: I rise to ask the Attorney-General to make clear what will be the effect of paragraph (b)of the new Clause which has been accepted on this proposed new Clause. As I understand, it means that in cases where a man dies intestate this Bill will have no operation and that, if he leaves a will in which he disposes of some portion of his estate and the rest is intestate, that will go to the next of kin and that in that case also the matter will not arise. I hope my right hon. and learned Friend will make that clear, because I thought that under the new Clause which we have accepted the Bill would have no application in cases of intestature.

12.27 p.m.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: I hope we may have a definition from the Front Bench on this matter of "testator" in order to clear up the confusion in the minds of one or two people as to the difference between testators and intestators. When we have two or three lawyers speaking on these Bills I feel that other hon. Members must act as a jury. They explain something which is often done so much better by a layman, except in the case of the learned Attorney-General. I would like to comment on the very dangerous speech of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies). He said he wanted to make the Bill retrospective. We do not as a general rule make Bills retrospective. He wanted it to be made retrospective in regard to certain cases for a few years. Has he any authority from the leaders of his party for making a statement of that kind? Has he
consulted his hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) as to what happens when we begins to make Bills retrospective?

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: If the hon. Gentleman listened attentively to what I said he would know that I made it clear that this is a private Member's Bill and that we all speak our own minds on it.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I understand that position, for I was listening as I always do to his speeches when I stay here. Although he spoke with the voice of a Private Member, he is sitting on the Front Bench, and I have always held that there should be a difference between the authority to be attached to a Front Bench speech and that of a Back bench speech. The House should have its attention drawn to the fact that the hon. Member who is acting as leader of the Opposition to-day wishes, with no contradiction from his Party behind him, to make this legislation retrospective. It is essential in these matters to have a definite date for the Bill. I do not like this proposed new Clause, for I think it would be much better if the Bill were kept as it is, and it came into operation at the end of the year. I do not like the wobbling attitude of my hon. Friend who is in charge of the Bill. The Measure interferes with the right of people making wills. If it passes, as I hope it will, we should give the ordinary person who wishes to adjust any error that has been made in the will a chance to do so. He should be given reasonable time—five or six months—to do it. This Bill will affect a great number of people, and they should be able to receive the advice of their legal advisers as to any changes that should be made in order to make their wills in accordance with the Bill. Six months is not too long a time for that to be done. My hon. Friend was wise in his original intention, because it gave time for any changes to be made. If the Bill is put into operation too quickly, it will lead to cases of legal dispute.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: My hon. Friend suggests that I have wobbled a little in connection with this particular Clause. I have not yet dealt with the conditions of Clause 6. We have not yet reached that point. There are two matters raised in that Clause.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I never for a moment thought that with regard to Clause 6, and it would not have been in order if I had brought it in. I feel inclined to vote against the new Clause. I like to feel that anything that comes from the Government is good, but on this occasion I feel, with great regret, obliged to ask my hon. Friend to stand firm on his original position. There is a further point as to whether the Home Office comes in under this particular provision. It would be awkward if this Bill led to some trouble which might affect that Department.

12.34 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: My hon. Friend opposite, I am afraid, will have to make up his mind whether he agrees with the new Clause now proposed or whether he prefers Clause 6 as it stands in its present form. He led me to think that he proposed to make the best of both Clauses.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: The point about Clause 6 is that it contains a definition which is not covered by the new Clause. It will have to be considered when Clause 6 is reached. That is a different thing from the point in regard to the date on which the Bill should come into operation

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Really my hon. Friend is under a misapprehension when he says the Amendment to leave out the definition in Clause 6 will have to be considered. If he means that when it comes to be considered the House can leave the so-called definition in the Bill after it has accepted this new Clause, that would be to make sheer nonsense of the thing.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has put down an Amendment to Clause 6 which proposes to leave out the definition regarding such portions of an estate as come within the meaning of "intestate" and that will be dealt with. I have accepted my hon. Friend's Amendment regarding the date.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I desire to say no more, because my hon. Friend is in charge of the Bill and he will take his own course, and will advise the House to do what he thinks proper, but, for what it is worth, I tender my advice to the House, and the point is simply this.
The Clause which my hon. Friend has called the definition Clause describes the testator as a person who dies after the 31st December, 1934. My hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk (Mr. Turton) pointed out that in certain circumstances my own suggested date will be an earlier date than 31st December, 1934. It is for the House to say whether it prefers the date 31st December, 1934, or the date when the Bill becomes law by receiving the Royal Assent, or some later date, or some intermediate date. My proposal is made in the interests of clarity. It is very desirable that the public, especially the unlearned public, shall have in this Bill a very clear definition as to the testators to whom it will apply. At present that information is tucked away in obscure language in a definition of "testator", but it is only a definition used in connection with the date, and not a definition of a testator apart from the question of the date of his death. If my Clause is accepted this definition will not be required.
My hon. Friend opposite will advise the House as he thinks fit and make his own decision. I put forward this Clause to give the House the opportunity of saying what date is preferred, the 31st December, 1934, or the date when the Bill becomes law, or some other date. So far as the definition of testator is concerned, somebody has suggested that we want a definition, but I submit that we do not. A testator is a person who leaves a will or testament. The fact that he does not dispose of some of his property does not prevent him from being a testator. Somebody has invented an expression which I have never heard—"intestator." That may be a Yorkshire expression. But, for once, "testator" means what it says, and I do not think any definition is wanted apart from this question as to which class of testators are to be covered by the Bill—people who die after the Bill passes or people who die after the 31st December, 1934.

Mr. TURTON: Frankly I think that most lawyers in the House will prefer my right hon. and learned Friend's way of dealing with this to that of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne). At the same time I am not alone in wanting this Bill not to come into operation until January, 1935.
Perhaps now, or in another place, the Attorney-General would so alter the wording that it shall be quite clear that the Act will not come into force until 1st January, 1935. I quite agree that it is a monstrous thing that the date of operation should be tucked away in a corner where nobody can find it.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If the hon. Gentleman desires that date to be put in it is for him or somebody to move that the words should be "1st January, 1935," instead of the words "the commencement of this Act". I cannot undertake to do that in another place. My duties in connection with this Bill are very limited. I do not know who will be in charge of it in another place, and now is the time.

12.40 p.m.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: There is no question in the minds of the promoters that a proper date is a date such as the 1st January, 1935, or the 31st December, 1934. My right hon. and learned Friend put before the House the advantages of bringing the Act into operation at once, and I said that if that was the legal view I should have no objection to that, but I am still in favour of the words in the Bill. I had been advised that there was a further point in Clause 6 which would have to be dealt with, but the right hon. Gentleman now tells me that that is not necessary. We are dealing at the moment, however, with the date only, and if the object of the Amendment is to bring the Act into operation immediately it receives the Royal Assent instead of the 1st January, 1935, I think the House would prefer the words in the Bill.

12.41 p.m.

Mr. DENMAN: I think the motion before us is that this Clause be read a Second time, and, if that were got out of the way, it would be in order to move an Amendment to leave out of the new Clause the words "the commencement of the Act" and to insert the words "1st January, 1935." That would produce the effect which a great many Members of this House want. The House hears such a variety of speeches from the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) that I am not sure whether hon. Members appreciated the real importance of the
argument which he included in his last speech, and that is the importance of giving testators time to look round. This Measure will produce a great change in the law, and people who have executed a will will not, perhaps, tumble immediately to the effects of the change, and six months is not too long a time to enable them to take stock of the new position. The interests of lawyers and others have been freely referred to this morning, but not so much the interests of testators. I think the least we can do is give them a full six months to revise such documents as they may have made.

Question, "That the Clause be read a Second time," put, and agreed to.

12.43 p.m.

Mr. TURTON: I beg to move, as an Amendment to the proposed Clause, in line 1, to leave out "commencement of this Act," and to insert "first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five."
This is a manuscript Amendment, and I do not think I need to argue it, because the House is fully seized of the problem, and I feel we can agree with the hon. Member for Central Leeds (Mr. Denman) that an opportunity ought to be provided for testators who may think of bringing their wives back into the fold of their wills to do so.

Mr. DENMAN: I beg to second the Amendment.

12.44 p.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: If all wills made in this country were to be affected by this Bill I should agree with the Amendment, but I always understood that it will affect only a very small number of wills. If the date 1st January, 1935, is included no will up to then will be affected. On this question of the date, I would point out the difference in the attitude of the Government towards the same question in another Bill. They are introducing a Bill next Monday to commence on 1st January, 1936, so far as young children are concerned. This Bill, of course is only concerned with a quarrel between the rich people of this country, and nothing else.

Viscountess ASTOR: No.

Mr. DAVIES: This Bill has arisen because some people have too much money
to give away. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name"] If we had a Socialist State, this Bill would not be necessary.

Mr. MOLSON: Are we to understand that in the happy Socialist State of the future there is to be no inheritance at all?

Mr. DAVIES: In the proper order of society these problems cannot arise.

Viscountess ASTOR: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what would be a proper order of society.

Mr. DAVIES: I imagine that the Attorney-General has put the date in the Bill for the sake of security and clarity. Might I ask the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) one thing? It is the intention of the Bill to deal with cases of very great hardship. Why are we asked that it should come into operation on the 1st January, 1935, when some of those very hard cases may arise immediately upon the passing of the Bill? If the Bill is necessary, it ought to be available so that cases may be dealt with immediately upon the passing of the Bill.

12.47 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: The hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) has given the key-note why this manuscript Amendment should be accepted. He says that very few wills would be affected by the Bill. I think that that is so. The position contemplated by this Bill is an unnatural one which very seldom arises, but if you put it off until January, 1935, the wills will be put in order, and there will be no cases. If you give a reasonable time, as was suggested by the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams), a man who has unnaturally disinherited his lawful wedded wife and his children will say to himself, "I find I cannot do it. I must go and put my will in order," and he will go and put his will in order. That will be a disaster for my profession, because he will not have to go to court about it, and a strain upon a very deserving class will be avoided. The way to avoid it is to put in the proposed words, "January, 1935." I do not gamble and I will not be affected by the Betting Bill, but I would be prepared to bet that there will be none of this class of will in existence, because they will all be put in order, if this Amendment is inserted.

12.49 p.m.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: The hon. and learned Member for Argyllshire (Mr. Macquisten) has confirmed my opinion that, as I told the House just now, there will be less work for lawyers, and that is the reason why the Amendment should be accepted by the House. I congratulate the hon. Member for Central Leeds (Mr. Denman) most sincerely upon his agreement with my view.

Mr. DENMAN: It was due to the hon. Member's lucidity, which made it impossible to mistake his meaning.

Mr. WILLIAMS: My only object in rising on this occasion is to express the hope that the Amendment will be accepted, as it will meet the whole of the difficulties which have arisen between the promoters of the Bill and the Attorney-General. If they can be dealt with in this way, we shall be able to get on with the Bill and perform a useful morning's work. If this Amendment is accepted, it will smooth out of the way all the real difficulties in the Bill.

12.50 p.m.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: For the reasons which I gave a moment ago, I am perfectly willing to accept this Amendment. I have always thought that time should be given for the ground to be prepared. The experience of other countries shows that the result of legislation of this sort is not a large amount of new litigation, but on the contrary it has very often led to the making of just wills. It is desirable that time should be given for the preparation of the new conditions. I am afraid that what has been said from the Socialist Benches regarding the rich is also not quite accurate. We find in practice that this is not a question of the wills of rich people at all. Most of these very hard cases arise out of very small wills. People may build up a business together, and from inadvertence or from spite some change is made at the last moment, very often against the woman or the man who has been the partner in building up the business. Hon. Members must not be led into thinking that we are dealing with rich people; we are dealing with all classes, and probably more with the lower middle-class than with any other.

12.52 p.m.

Mr. LECKIE: I oppose the Amendment. This morniz we have heard very useful arguments in favour of the [...] being brought into force at the earliest possible moment. We all hope that the Bill will be passed by the end of July, and in that case there will be five months left before 1st January. In view of what the Attorney-General has said about the correspondence he has received and of the correspondence which has also been received by my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne), it is very desirable that the Bill should be brought into force at the earliest possible moment. There is no adequate reason why it should be postponed to 1st January. Although I do not wish to be disloyal to my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster, who has done so much and acted so wisely in promoting this Bill, I must support the Attorney-General, and I hope that the new Clause will be accepted.

12.54 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Speaking for myself, I should have thought that if this were a good Bill, and if the hon. Member for Kidderminster believed in his Bill, he would agree with me that it should be brought into force at the earliest possible moment. Apparently, he thinks less of this Bill than I do.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: It has nothing to do with thinking well of the Bill. It may be desirable to give time for people to know about it.

12.55 p.m.

Mr. W. S. MORRISON: Those who support this Amendment forget that it cuts both ways. It will be possible for a testator, the effects of whose enmity, vindictiveness and spite this Bill is trying to cure, to cut people out when the Bill is passed by making over his estate in the form of a debt which will be a first charge upon the assets of the estate when he dies. My hon. Friends who seek to give the testator time to make a just will by postponing the operation of the Bill till the 1st January next are at the same moment giving the vindictive testator the opportunity of taking legal measures to prevent the Bill from affecting him. I see no answer to the proposition that, if this is an evil which we desire to remedy, it ought to be
remedied at once, and, far from the Amendment giving the testator an opportunity to make a just will, if he [...] just motive in his mind it will give the same testator, with that unjust motive, an opportunity for making his motive effective, to the detriment of his wife and family. Accordingly, I shall resist the Amendment.

12.56 p.m.

Mr. CROOM-JOHNSON: I desire to adopt the same attitude as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cirencester (Mr. W. S. Morrison). It seems to me that, if there is some deficiency in the existing law which is resulting in a number of people suffering real hardship, the manifest duty of this House, when it decides to amend that law, is to see that the hardship is removed at the earliest possible moment. I express no opinion—and, indeed, I should probably be out of Order in expressing any opinion—as to whether the precise form of this Bill is the right way to achieve the object, but, assuming that it is going to be put into shape, it seems to me that the right thing to do is to see that it is brought into force at the earliest possible moment. For these reasons I shall support the Clause which has been moved by the Attorney-General, and shall oppose the Amendment.

12.57 p.m.

Mr. JANNER: I desire to add a few words in agreement with the last two speakers. It appears to me that, if we intend to carry this Measure into effect, we ought to take the earliest opportunity of putting its provisions into practice, and I believe that people who have already studied the reports which have been published will have had ample opportunity of finding out, from the papers and from the general information which is going about, whether a Measure of this nature is likely to be passed or not. I cannot understand why it should be argued that there should be any delay in this matter at all. If a person wishes to change his will, he can do so in a few hours. A person who is vindictive is very likely to find out quickly what has happened in regard to a Measure of this kind, and will take such steps as are necessary without waiting until the 1st January next year; or, on the other hand, he may wait until the day before
the 1st January, in the hope, I will not say that he may die, but in the hope that if he does die his vicious intentions may be carried out in spite of the fact that such a Measure is likely to come into operation later. In these circumstances, I think the House ought to accept the Clause.

12.58 p.m.

Mr. SPENS: I desire to support the Amendment. I am always frightened lest hard cases may make bad law. We have to remember that many people in this country have made provision for their wives and families otherwise than by their will, and there may be nothing in their will relating to the surviving wife or one or more children. Obviously, if there is nothing in the will to that effect, there will be a primâ facie case for the particular person who has been left out to go to the courts and say that no reasonable provision has been made. In the case of persons of this sort, many of them belonging to the lower middle class, who make provision outside their will for one particular charge, or perhaps for a wife if they are living apart, or something of that sort, ample time ought to be given to enable them to understand what is intended by the Bill, and to afford them the opportunity of making some provision in their will or explaining why they have made no provision by their will, so that anyone who wants to take advantage of the Act cannot do so without the court being fully seized of all the facts relating to the case.

Mr. JANNER: Would the hon. and learned Gentleman be good enough to tell us whether, in the event of a person consulting him under the provisions of the Bill in such circumstances as he has outlined, he would advise him to take the case or not?

Mr. SPENS: I should advise anybody who had made no provision by his will for a wife or child to make a new will, and to put into the will the reason why he had not made such provision.

Mr. JANNER: That is not my point. Supposing that due provision had been made in his lifetime by the testator, would the hon. and learned Gentleman then, in view of the provisions of this Bill, advise a person who desired to contest the will to do so?

Mr. SPENS: As the Bill is at present drafted, it would entirely depend upon whether I was informed by that person that any due provision had been made. That is the whole point. With the Bill as it is at present drafted, the great difficulty would be to find out what, if any, provision had been made outside the will, and it is because, where people have made provision outside their will, there may be nothing in the will at the present moment relating to that particular member of their family, that I think they ought to have at least six months in which to make a new will.

1.3 p.m.

Mr. KNIGHT: I should like to say a few words as a friend of the Bill who understands the motives of a number of those who have taken part in this discussion. I want to advance the Bill. The immediate question before the House is whether the Bill should come into operation at the earliest possible date, and I want to commend to the House the view that that course should be taken. The Bill is designed to end a scandal which has affected a good many people for a good many years, and the practical consideration put by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ash-ford (Mr. Spens) is that this delayed change in the law should be still further delayed, so that persons who are affected by it may be able to make further preparations to avoid it. The hon. and learned Member for Cirencester (Mr. W. S. Morrison) actually went so far as to propose a device by which this Measure could be defeated, and, as a matter of fact, that device can be used at any time, even if the Measure comes into operation. The creation of a charge to avoid the purposes of the Act will be open to anyone after the Act comes into operation if they choose to take that course, so that the hon. and learned Member is not, if he will allow me to say so, really assisting the House to get on with the Bill, but, on the contrary, is getting it off the Bill by making that suggestion. He reminds me of something that was said by a very great Member of this House—that the practice of the law was not calculated to liberalise the understanding; and, as I have listened to this discussion, a good deal of it has appeared to me to be an exemplification of that statement, especially the speech
of the hon. and learned Member, whose constituency at the moment escapes me, whose desire seems to be to prevent any change in the law.

Mr. CROOM-JOHNSON: The hon. and learned Gentleman has no right to say anything of the sort. If he had followed the proceedings of the House he would have known that frequently I have raised my voice in favour of amending the law.

Mr. KNIGHT: I was unable to indicate the hon. Member to whom I referred and, since the hon. and learned Gentleman apparently thinks that the description applies to him—

Mr. CROOM-JOHNSON: That really will not do. The hon. and learned Gentleman pointed deliberately at me. There are only two of us sitting on this bench. He said the name of my constituency escaped him. That I can well understand. If he did the decent thing, he would withdraw.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: On a point of Order. Is it in Order for one Member of the House to point at another?

Mr. KNIGHT: The direction in which I was looking and pointing—I apologise if I was out of Order in pointing—happened to be a direction in which were sitting three learned counsel in the law, and the fact that one of those three gentlemen chooses to get up and accept for himself a description which I did not put upon him the House will judge in its own way. I was going to say, in conclusion, that I hope the House will follow the advice of the Attorney-General and enable this change to come in the law as speedily as possible.

1.8 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: The hon. and learned Gentleman says the tendency to follow the law does not liberalise the mind. In the case of some gentlemen who follow the law it seems to labourise the mind and not increase their intelligence. Most people hate to think of the way the Chancellor of the Exchequer comes and plunders their estates. I am glad to think that one of the reforms that has been introduced in Italy is that there are no Death Duties. A testator with a grown-up family may select one particular member of it and settle him in life with capital or in a business. Some may not
want to consult lawyers, least of all learned counsel, and, if you do not give them reasonable time to turn round, there will be cases of very great hardship and fresh litigation which everyone wishes to avoid. After all, it is only a miserable minority of mankind, half-witted people, that the Bill is meant to deal with.

Mr. MAITLAND: rose—

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Sir Dennis Herbert): I think the hon. Member has exhausted his right.

1.10 p.m.

Mr. MAITLAND: No, with great respect I have not spoken. I want to support the Amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman below me has made a very powerful case, but let us test it. None of us desire that a person should make a will actuated by motives of vindictiveness or ill-will to his wife or family. A similar Bill to this was introduced by the hon. Lady the Member for the combined Universities (Miss Rathbone), and, in one speech, she took a rough and ready estimate of the number of people who might be affected by a Measure of the kind. She assumed—a figure which was not accepted in any sense as correct—that one out of every thousand might be regarded as a person who would be unjust. I will accept her figure for the purposes of my argument. It still leaves a vast number of just wills, and the House should be careful, in introducing what the Attorney-General has said is a very important change in the law and in attempting to remedy a grievance, that we do not inflict a greater hardship on a larger number of people.
There is on the Paper an Amendment which is very germane to this matter. It seeks to give to a testator the right to make a statutory declaration at the time that he makes his will as to the reasons why he does not make what the court may in the absence of such a declaration wrongly decide as to what is or is not reasonable provision for his wife and family. If that Amendment should be accepted as being in the general interest of a vast number of people, surely it would be a reasonable thing for the House to say, "We will give those people who are concerned an opportunity of explaining their reasons why they are making the provisions of
their will in a certain way." If the Attorney-General's proposal is carried, there will be a large number of people making just wills who will have no opportunity of making a declaration. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) and his friends have shown a most persuasive desire to accept Amendments couched in terms calculated to help the purpose of the Bill. I am sure if they accept the Amendment they are helping to improve the Measure, and at the same time they are avoiding the possibility of doing grave injustice to a number of people who would otherwise suffer.

1.13 p.m.

Mr. PIKE: I support the Amendment, But on grounds which have not yet been put before the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman below me said that in

Motion made, and Question, "That the Clause be added to the Bill," put, and agreed to.

his opinion the Bill was designed to put an end to scandal. Whether it is designed to do that or not, I believe its effect will be to put an end to personal liberty. The word "vindictiveness" has been mentioned many times. Many wills have been declared vindictive without any word having been written to show that they were vindictive. I support the Amendment because, if we say that the Bill shall not become operative until January, 1935, we shall at least give testators every opportunity of avoiding this continuous interference with their liberty to do as they like with their own.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the proposed Clause."

The House divided: Ayes, 75; Noes, 44.

Division No. 221.]
AYES.
[1.15 p.m.


Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)
George, Megan A. Lloyd (Anglesea)
Moreing, Adrian C.


Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)
Goldie, Noel B.
Moss, Captain H. J.


Attlee, Clement Richard
Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.


Baldwin-Webb, Colonel J.
Groves, Thomas E.
Palmer, Francis Noel


Banfield, John William
Gunston, Captain D. W.
Pybus, Sir Percy John


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)
Hamilton, Sir R. W. (Orkney & Zetl'nd)
Rathbone, Eleanor


Bernays, Robert
Holdsworth, Herbert
Rea, Walter Russell


Broadbent, Colonel John
Howitt, Dr. Alfred B.
Reid, William Allan (Derby)


Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Rickards, George William


Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Hume, Sir George Hopwood
Rosbotham, Sir Thomas


Cape, Thomas
Hurst, Sir Gerald B.
Rung, Norah Cecil


Carver, Major William H.
Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.
Rutherford, Sir John Hugo (Llverp'l)


Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.
Stuart, Lord C. Crichton-


Copeland, Ida
Janner, Barnett
Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart


Crooke, J. Smedley
Johnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles


Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Galnsb'ro)
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Tinker, John Joseph


Daggar, George
Kerr, Hamilton W.
Todd, A. L. S. (Kingswinford)


Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Knight, Holford
Wallace, John (Dunfermilne)


Danville, Alfred
Leckie, J. A.
Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgeour


Dickie, John P.
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Josiah


Dobbie, William
Lunn, William
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Edwards, Charles
McEntee, Valentine L.
Wilmot, John


Essenhigh, Reginald Clare
Magnay, Thomas
Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)


Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.



Foot, Isaac (Cornwall, Bodmin)
Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—


Fuller, Captain A. G.
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)
Mr. W. S. Morrison and Mr. Croom-Johnson.




NOES.


Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.
Harves, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Rutherford, John (Edmonton)


Bailey, Eric Alfred George
Jackson, Sir Henry (Wandsworth, C.)
Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart


Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)
Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Savery, Samuel Servington


Blaker, Sir Reginald
Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Somerville, Annesley A (Windsor)


Braithwaite, Maj. A. N. (Yorks, E. R.)
McKeag, William
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.


Clarry, Reginald George
Macquisten, Frederick Alexander
Spans, William Patrick


Clayton, Sir Christopher
Maitland, Adam
Tate, Mavis Constance


Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry
Meller, Sir Richard James
Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)
Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Moore, Lt.-Col. Thomas C. R. (Ayr)
Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.


Davison, Sir William Henry
Nunn, William
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)


Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
Pike, Cecil F.
Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)


George, Major G. Lloyd (Pembroke)
Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)



Greene, William P. C.
Remer, John R.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Grimston, R. V.
Ropner, Colonel L.
Mr. Turton and Mr. Denman.


Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Ross, Ronald D.

CLAUSE 1.—(Power for court to order payment out of net estate of testator for benefit of surviving spouse or child.)

1.23 p.m.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: I beg to move, in page 1, line 7, after "will," to insert "or otherwise."
The Amendment, which stands in the names of my hon. Friends whose absence I very much deplore, is one upon which they set considerable store, and for that reason, although I am not acquainted with the full brief on behalf of the Amendment, I move it more or less formally. I think that this is a matter giving a certain width of scope to the Bill which the hon. Member in charge of it will be able to accept.

1.24 p.m.

Mr. GALBRAITH: I beg to second the Amendment.
This is obviously a matter which ought to be provided for. The first words of Sub-section (1) of Clause 1 are to this effect:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, if a testator has not by his will made reasonable provision for the maintenance of a spouse or child, the court may at its discretion
make such reasonable provision as it thinks fit. If the testator has in any way, other than by his will, made reasonable provision for the spouse or child, it is a matter which ought to affect the jurisdiction of the court, and obviously be taken into account. I think that this is a matter which the promoters of the Bill should accept.

1.25 p.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: I hope the promoter of the Bill will accept the Amendment. Clause 1 says:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, if a testator has not by his will made reasonable provision.
I know of cases where the man had bought annuities for his wife and children. That is a reasonable way of providing for their future, apart from providing for them in the will. Our trouble is, that the Attorney-General gives advice to the hon. Member in charge of the Bill and he declines to accept that advice. In Committee upstairs he accepted all the advice given to him by the Attorney-General, but this
morning because he did not accept some sensible advice we spent an hour in discussion, and he was defeated in the end. I hope that if he declines to accept the advice of the Attorney-General he will on this occasion accept the advice of an ordinary layman who, with a great deal of humility, can claim to have some common sense, if not legal knowledge.

1.26 p.m.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: I always listen with interest to any advice given to me by the hon. Member. I am rather surprised that he should twit me on not having accepted the advice of the Attorney-General this morning. With regard to the hour that was taken by the discussion, very little was taken up by the remarks of mine. I have the greatest sympathy with the object of the Amendment, but I cannot accept it, because it is unnecessary. If it were necessary I should accept it at once, but the advice that I have received, including the advice of my right hon. Friend the Attorney-General, is to the effect that the Amendment is unnecessary. In Clause 1 (2) the Court is given special power to take every factor into consideration in deciding on any application that may be brought before it, and it is clear that one of the considerations must be any settlement made otherwise than by will, or any money given in the lifetime of the testator. The Court must be made aware of all these facts. I am advised that to put in the proposed words would complicate the position and would not achieve the end which the mover of the Amendment has in view.

1.28 p.m.

Sir GERALD HURST: The hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) raised the question of an annuity having been arranged, and said that it would be wrong that an annuity or a settlement should be disregarded. The test to be applied is, does that annuity form part of
the present or future income of the applicant.
If so, the Court is expressly directed to have regard to such annuity. Is it a:
matter or thing which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant or material in relation to the applicant.
The answer is, yes. It is obviously relevant and material, therefore the court
must have regard to it as being relevant to any present or future income and as being relevant and material in relation to the applicant. It follows that the insertion of the words, "or otherwise," or the insertion of the words in the next Amendment, "or by any deed," would be harmless but superfluous.

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: On a point of Order. May I be permitted to withdraw the Amendment?

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: That is not a point of Order.

Mr. McKEAG: The hon. Member who is sponsoring the Bill—

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: I owe the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) an apology. I forgot that he was the hon. Member who moved the Amendment. Am I to understand that he wishes to withdraw the Amendment?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes. I rose for that purpose, in order to save time, because I think the explanation is adequate. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

1.31 p.m.

Mr. TURTON: On a point of Order. May I ask whether the next Amendment, which stands in my name, and which is very material, will be called. If we are to have a wide discussion on the two Amendments it might save time. Is it your intention to call that Amendment?

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: It depends on what happens to the present Amendment. Is it the wish of the Committee that the Amendment be withdrawn?

Mr. TURTON: No. I am not entirely satisfied with the explanation that has been given by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) and the explanation given earlier by the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers). The words, "or otherwise," are probably too wide, but I cannot understand the attitude of the promoters of the Bill. If they wished to put in words in Sub-section (1) to give the Courts full discretion, I could understand their attitude. If they said: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, if the testator has not made reasonable
provision for maintenance," that would be quite an intelligible position to take up, but they have put in the words "by his will." Therefore, they are indicating to the spouse or child that if they are not mentioned in the will and if they are mentioned in a deed they can go to the court. That appears to me to be a misfortune. I agree that to some extent these Amendments are redundant, but it is the misfortune of this country, perhaps, that these laws are read not only by lawyers but by laymen—

Notice taken that 40 members were not present; House counted, and 40 members being present—

Mr. TURTON: As I was saying, although these words may be redundant, they are nevertheless advisable. The Bill will not only be read by lawyers but by laymen and, therefore, it should be quite clearly stated that if a man makes provision by will or deed for his spouse or children that they cannot use the Bill. It is not really any answer to say that under Sub-section (2) the court has a wide discretion. In many matters the court is given a wide discretion. We want to prevent the court being delayed and hindered by a number of applications which will be dismissed on the ground that provision has already been made in some deed or otherwise. The hon. Member for Kidderminster is not serving the cause of poor litigants when he suggests that the words "or by any deed" should be excluded. The Attorney-General knows what great difficulties the courts are under owing to the number of litigations before them and we should be chary before taking any step which will cause a greater amount of confusion and dislocation of work. I can only see one way out. If the hon. Member for Kidderminster cannot accept these words then you will have to appoint additional judges. We want additional judges as it is, and if the hon. Member is going to propose that they should be appointed I am quite willing to withdraw my support of the Amendment. But if we are going to have the same number of judges to do this work—and a great deal of work will be involved when the Bill becomes law—we should put in the words "or otherwise" or my own Amendment, "or by any deed."
Many jointures and portions are made, and in nearly every case where a man has provided his wife with a jointure deed he will exclude her from his will, because he has already made proper provision for her, and will not desire to take away from the little remains for his children. If she is of a malevolent frame of mind or wants the memory of her husband to be embittered in the courts, she will take steps to bring an action to get reasonable maintenance under the Bill. There are many malevolent and litigious persons who wish to keep the courts busy with their own litigation, right or wrong, they have a litigious mania, and in its present form the Bill encourages this litigious mania. I would ask the hon. Member for Kidderminster to think over this matter and if he cannot accept this Amendment to accept mine, which will really be a benefit to his Bill and also a benefit to the spouse and children.

1.40 p.m.

Mr. JANNER: I cannot quite understand the exact nature of the requirements of the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton). I have always regarded what he says with a considerable amount of interest and the points he has brought before the House on previous occasions have proved of great value. But on this occasion I am afraid that the only conclusion to which I can come is that his contentions and suggestions can only result in delaying the passage of the Bill into law, that they will obstruct the passing of the Bill. I hope that that state of mind not prevailing amongst those who are speaking with such enthusiasm about the Bill.

Mr. TURTON: I do not think the hon. Member is entitled to say that, and I hope he will withdraw it. The hon. Member for Kidderminster has explained that he would regard these words as perfectly necessary but for Sub-section (2) of Clause 1, and I cannot see how I am obstructing the Bill in suggesting words which the hon. Member for Kidderminster says are not unnecessary.

Mr. JANNER: I do not want the hon. Member to feel upset about any remark of mine and it may be that what I have said will apply better to other hon. Members. But not only is Sub-section (2) of Clause 1 a covering provision but you have in Sub-section (1) itself the
important words "reasonable provision". It would be ridiculous for anyone to suggest that the will had not made reasonable provision if a larger proportion of the estate been already handed over to the persons concerned. "Reasonable provision" means what it says and requires very little explanation. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton says why not leave out the words "by his will." He may be basing his argument on the point that the word "testator" is in the Bill, but the whole object of the Bill is to provide for such cases as would come within the compass of the words, "has not by his will made reasonable provision." I hope we shall not burden the Bill with more words than are necessary. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton wants the words "or by any deed" put in. The whole point is that the court will not accept a case where "reasonable provision" has been made, and I am certain that if any litigant goes to a lawyer, a poor persons' lawyer, or a lawyer in the ordinary course of his practice, or to any society interested, they will be told that if that kind of provision has been made they stand no chance of succeeding in an action, and that it is possible that the costs will be awarded against them, and they may find themselves in the unhappy position of having to pay a heavy sum for nothing. I hope we shall be able to press on with the Measure. I must compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) on having appreciated the fact that it was important to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

1.46 p.m.

Mr. McKEAG: I do not know what experience the hon. Member who has just spoken has on this matter, but I, speaking as a solicitor and a practical lawyer who might be called upon to advise on matters of this sort, seriously suggest to the House that the hands of the lawyers would be materially strengthened in advising on this matter if the words "or otherwise" were accepted. I am entirely in sympathy with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) and I can only think that the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. C. Williams) was somewhat precipitate in attempting to withdraw his Amendment. The main point is that the insertion of these words will give to the Bill a scope which is very desirable indeed. The hon. Member for
Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) said he was in sympathy with the desire of the Amendment but that the words were unnecessary.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: I said I was advised that they are entirely unnecessary.

Mr. McKEAG: The hon. Member may be so advised, but opinions differ on the subject and, speaking with some little knowledge of these matters, my view is that the Bill would be materially strengthened by the insertion of these words. Take the position of a lawyer in advising on this matter. If the words "or otherwise" are inserted he would be in a position to advise his client who was seeking to commence litigation, that "reasonable provision" has already been made, though that provision had been made other than by will. But someone may say, "has not by his will made reasonable provision", and insist on an action being commenced. While the hon. Member for Kidderminster may have been advised that these words are unecessary, in my view it is desirable that they should be inserted. If inserted they will, I think, avoid a lot of unnecessary and probably vindictive litigation.

1.49 p.m.

Mr. SPENS: I would suggest to the hon. Gentleman who spoke last that the words which follow the word "if" in Sub-section (1) are the conditions precedent which give the court jurisdiction to make an order at all. The Bill provides that the only thing that the court has to look at is whether or not the testator by his will has, "made reasonable provision". That entitles a person to go to the court merely looking at the will. It is suggested that the words "or otherwise" should be inserted here. Suppose that the hon. Member for Durham (Mr. McKeag) had a client who came to him, a person for whom in fact years ago very reasonable provision has been made outside the will, but that client does not inform him of it and the hon. Member merely looks at the will and sees no reference in it to any such provision. The hon. Member advises his client to go to the court, and the court may make an order in complete ignorance that there has been any other provision made at all. Subsequently it turns out that there was a previous provision made years ago and the court's order would be utterly
illegal or void. I do hope that the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill will not accept either this or the following Amendment to insert the words "or by any deed", because, with great respect, my remarks apply in exactly the same way to the following Amendment. If this Amendment is accepted the Bill will become utterly unworkable.

1.50 p.m.

Sir J. WITHERS: Both this Amendment and the next Amendment, to insert the words "or by any deed," are misconceived. The Bill deals with the estates of testators and has nothing whatever to do with deeds, "or otherwise," at all, except in so far as that is dealt with in Sub-section (2). That Subsection provides that when applicants make an application for rectification of a testator's will consideration has to be given to what has been done otherwise. It would make the whole thing gibberish to put in these words.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: In that case would the court be entitled to know whether an annuity had been bought?

Sir J. WITHERS: Certainly. The applicant would have to disclose absolutely everything in regard to any present or future income from any source. He has to disclose that under Subsection (2). The wife or husband would have to show not only what was got from the testator but from all sources. These words are entirely misconceived and would be redundant. We are dealing with a testator's estate—

Mr. C. WILLIAMS: Suppose that on some previous occasion a certain amount has been made over to the person and he has spent the lot? What is the position?

Sir J. WITHERS: That is a matter which the court would have to consider. Suppose that the testator handed over to his son £10,000 to set him up in business, and then the son spent it, and when the testator died the son was not mentioned in the will because the testator thought that he was already provided for. What would be the position? The son would have to go to the court. The other people would say, "Oh, this boy ought not to have £10,000, for he has already had £10,000," and then the judge would have to consider whether,
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable that he should or should not have anything more. I suggest that that is the position.

Mr. TURTON: But surely Sub-section (2) deals only with the present or future income of the applicant. Therefore the case put by the hon. and learned Member for Ashford (Mr. Spens) is the very case in which it is necessary to have the words "or otherwise".

Sir G. HURST: Is not the answer to that the wording of Sub-section (2), "consider relevant or material" matter?

Sir J. WITHERS: Yes.

1.54 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I must say that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers) has held out a pleasant vista of future litigation. The prodigal son will always be coming before the courts, and as to the other members of the family, how it will provoke the spirit of human kindness when they come to show how he wasted his substance in riotous living. He may have come back on one or two occasions and have had as many fatted calves slain for him as are slain in the South of Ireland to-day, and provision may have been made again and again for him, but at the end of the day he comes to the court and says, "Oh, yes, it is quite true, but the death of my beloved father and mother has given me such a shock that I promise to be a good citizen from now onwards, and I therefore pray that notwithstanding all that I have received and all that I have dissipated I may have some share of the estate from which my father has unjustly disinherited me." These matters are to come before a judge but questions of that kind are not questions which it is competent for a judge to decide. These are matters which ought to be decided by a jury of the applicant's peers, otherwise you will have as many opinions on these points as there are judges. When these matters are referred to a jury you go to the country as it were upon them, and you would get a far more commonsense view in that way than you will get under this system. I think probably the proposal to amend the Clause is sound. I would deprecate leaving the matter as it-is in the Bill.

1.56 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I do not know whether my opinion on the question is of any interest or importance to the House, but the view presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers) appears to me to be the right view having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of the Clause and the use of the word "reasonable" twice in Sub-section (1). I very much doubt whether the additional words proposed would not introduce unnecessary complications.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: How is "reasonable" to be defined? What is reasonable to one person may be considered most unreasonable by another person.

1.57 p.m.

Mr. MACMILLAN: I owe an apology to the House for my absence at an earlier stage when this Amendment, which stands in my name, was proposed. I hope the House will accept my apology and will not consider it due to any discourtesy on my part that I was not present to move the Amendment myself. The object of putting down the Amendment was to make clear the point which I now understand from the Attorney-General is in his opinion covered by Sub-section (2) of Clause 1. But in the case of estates of any considerable size I would have said that it was the practice to-day in normal circumstances that the majority of the children of any father making a will did not expect to inherit under that will. I think the ordinary practice of people of substance is to provide for their children by deed, or settlement, and it ought to be made clear that there is no intention in this Bill to interfere with that practice. Surely it is the case in connection with the normal estate of any considerable size, that married daughters, younger sons, and so on, have been provided for by deed or by settlement prior to the death of the testator. If the object of the Bill is to alter the whole law of inheritance, let it be done in a straightforward way. I, for my part, think there is a great deal to be said for the Scottish system of inheritance. If we wish to adopt it let us do so, but I am afraid that by tinkering with the present English system of the free right of testamentary disposition we may produce a great many more anomalies than those which we seek to remove.

Sir J. WITHERS: A Bill was actually passed in this House applying the Scottish system. It was sent to a Select Committee, and the Select Committee declined to have the Scottish system because, they said, it was a hard and fast system. They turned it down and they recommended the particular system which is in this Bill.

Mr. MACMILLAN: The hon. Member speaks as an Englishman, and I know that there is a certain prejudice against Scotland. But I say that in theory there is a great deal to be said for the Scottish system. It is, at any rate, an understandable, theoretical system of inheritance. It is based upon a principle which one can understand and follow. But this is a proposal to interfere as I say with the free right of testamentary disposition which exists in England by trying to make tinkering amendments in the present system. I submit that that involves certain dangers and may create as many hardships as it seeks to remove. We have here in contra-distinction the spirit of Scotland and the spirit of England. Whereas in Scotland the system is operated upon general established principles, we have in these proposals a typical example of trying not to lay down any new system, but to tinker with an

old one in a way which may be dangerous.

The object of this Amendment is to make plain that the governing words of Clause 1 do not mean that every child is necessarily to have the right to make an application because he thinks that he ought to inherit under a will. We ask that account should be taken of the present practice of making provision for members of a family by deed or settlement. That is done for reasons other than sentimental reasons in some cases. It may be done for reasons of taxation for example and the practice is, perhaps, growing. If we do not amend the Bill in the way proposed it may be used to upset the present system. In spite of what the Attorney-General said, I still think that in the opening words of the first Clause of the Bill it ought to be made clear to the court that it is not the intention of Parliament to lay down a principle that every child has a right to inherit under a will, but that it is intended that account should be had of other provision which has been made in the ordinary practice in English family life.

Question put, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 55; Noes, 67.

Division No. 222.]
AYES.
[2.4 p.m.


Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)
Greene, William P. C.
Radford, E. A.


Attlee, Clement Richard
Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Raikes, Henry V. A. M.


Bailey, Eric Alfred George
Groves, Thomas E.
Ropner, Colonel L.


Banfield, John William
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Ross, Ronald D.


Batey, Joseph
Hanley, Dennis A.
Rutherford, John (Edmonton)


Blaker, Sir Reginald
Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Savery, Samuel Servington


Broadbent, Colonel John
Joel, Dudley J. Barnato
Simmonds, Oliver Edwin


Brown, C. W. E. (Notts., Mansfield)
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)


Cadogan, Hon. Edward
Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.


Cape, Thomas
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Thorne, William James


Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry
Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Tinker, John Joseph


Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)
Lunn, William
Turton, Robert Hugh


Daggar, George
Macquisten, Frederick Alexander
Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)
Maitland, Adam
Watt, Captain George Steven H.


Dobbie, William
Meller, Sir Richard James
Williams, Charles (Devon, Torquay)


Edwards, Charles
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Fuller, Captain A. G.
Moss, Captain H. J.
Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)


Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.



Goldie, Noel B.
Pike, Cecil F.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—




Mr. Macmillan and Mr. McKeag.


NOES.


Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.
Clarry, Reginald George
George, Megan A. Lloyd (Anglesea)


Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)
Clayton, Sir Christopher
Grimston, R. V.


Balfour, Capt. Harold (I. of Thanet)
Copeland, Ida
Hamilton, Sir R. W. (Orkney & Zetl'nd)


Balniel, Lord
Crooke, J. Smedley
Holdsworth, Herbert


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th,C.)
Denman, Hon. R. D.
Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)


Bernays, Robert
Denville, Alfred
Hume, Sir George Hopwood


Boyce, H. Leslie
Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F.
Hurst, Sir Gerald B.


Braithwaite, Maj. A. N. (Yorks, E. R.)
Dickie, John P.
Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.


Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Essenhigh, Reginald Clare
James, Wing-Com. A. W. H.


Carver, Major William H.
Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)
Johnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)


Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Foot, Isaac (Cornwall, Bodmin)
Kerr, Hamilton W.


Leckie, J. A.
Rea, Walter Russell
Wallace, Captain D. E. (Hornsey)


McEntee, Valentine L.
Reid, William Allan (Derby)
Wallace, John (Dunfermilne)


Magnay, Thomas
Renter, John R.
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Rickards, George William
Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.


Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
Runge, Norah Cecil
Wedderburn, Henry James Scrymgeour


Moreing, Adrian C.
Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart
Wedgwood, Rt. Hon. Joslah


Morris-Jones, Dr. J. H. (Denbigh)
Shakespeare, Geoffrey H.
Whiteside, Borras Noel H.


Morrison, William Shepherd
Spens, William Patrick
Wilmot, John


Nunn, William
Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart
Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)


Patrick, Colin M.
Tate, Mavis Constance



Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Rathbone, Eleanor
Todd, A. L. S. (Kingswinford)
Sir John Withers and Mr. Janner.

2.11 p.m.

Mr. MACMILLAN: I beg to move, in page 1, line 8, after "or" to insert "legitimate."
The object of the Amendment is to make it clear that the expression "child" in the Bill refers to a legitimate child. I am afraid I have not sufficient knowledge as a lawyer to know whether this is absolutely necessary or not, but I think it would be the object of the promoters of the Bill that the rights conferred in the Bill should be confined to legitimate children. It may be that I am wrong. There may be an argument put forward that equal rights should be given to illegitimate as to legitimate children, but I am assuming that the object of the promoters is that the rights conferred in the Bill should be confined to legitimate children. I understand, from what I am told by legal authorities who have much more knowledge of these matters than I have, that in the ordinary practice of the interpretation of deeds and wills the expression "child" may mean either a legitimate or an illegitimate child. It means a legitimate child unless either the circumstances render it impossible that it could refer to such a child or the language of the will shows that the testator intended to use the expression in a different or a more extended sense. In either of these cases, it may mean or include an illegitimate child, or step-child, or grand-child. Therefore, I ask the House to make it quite clear that in this Bill the Legislature does not intend the expression "child" to be used in these wider senses in which it may be used in the ordinary interpretation of wills. I hope the House will accept the view that the new powers and rights that it is intended to confer in the Bill should be confined to the legitimate children of the testator. All the Amendments on the Paper in my name to Clause 6 are consequential upon this Amendment.

2.14 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I beg to second the Amendment.
There is, I think, some doubt about the point, and I think it ought to be absolutely clear one way or the other. It is a very important point, because the question of legitimacy might not arise for many years afterwards. It might never be raised. One has felt very great sympathy with those who may be in the position of not having been born legitimate children, but at the same time those of us who have had experience—and I may say that in Scotland solicitors and counsel for the poor have always a considerable experience of this regrettable aspect of life—know that you cannot always be sure in matters of that kind. The Scottish law has been very broad and charitable in that matter for centuries. We have always had the practice of the very sound principle of legitimisation by subsequent marriage. It is the one case in recent years where the English have adopted the Scottish law. It is very regrettable that the Scottish law is not adopted in this matter, but you cannot have the Scottish law of legitimisation on subsequent marriage without the father of the child admitting in his own heart paternity.
Here you may have case after case happening 20 years afterwards, and claims and trials, and think of the indignation of the mother and other members of the family if these other people suddenly appear from the ends of the earth. You are admitting a most dangerous principle. If you leave this without a clear definition, you will be introducing a matter of great dispute and perhaps of great injustice. It is all very well to speak of the system of blood tests but I have had cases where—well, one does not want to enter into these details, but one could not help having the feeling that a great injustice was being done, and we saw
only the other day the case of a young man who had gone a score of times to prison rather than admit paternity, and who finally succeeded in getting clear proof that he had been victimised. You might have cases occurring again and again. Some hon. Members may have seen a play called "It's a Boy," in which there is a man who makes a professional practice, whenever any person of substance is getting married, of introducing himself, having perhaps heard of some scandal in early life, and making use of that knowledge. If you do not have this definition, you are opening a gate, perhaps, to some very extraordinary proceedings, and if it is necessary to make the thing clear, I think that this Amendment ought to be accepted.

2.19 p.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: I am a little sorry that the hon. Gentleman has raised this issue, because it seems to me that in some cases the only child of the marriage might be an illegitimate child.

Mrs. TATE: Of the marriage?

Mr. DAVIES: We passed a law some time ago to legitimatise the illegitimate child.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: You took it from us.

Mr. DAVIES: We have taken a good many doubtful things from Scotland. I do not like to see Parliament doing anything against the illegitimate child, because it is not its fault that it is illegitimate. The illegitimate child may be the best. I think it is recorded that some of the most eminent men this country has ever produced were illegitimate children. Consequently, I would ask the House not to insert this word. If my knowledge counts for anything, I think that the illegitimate child from the start is under a disadvantage, and to place it under a further disadvantage by adding this word to the Clause would be grossly unfair to the child.

2.21 p.m.

Sir G. HURST: The hon. Gentleman who has just spoken has made an eloquent defence of the Bill on grounds which show, if I may say so with respect, that he quite misunderstands it. His defence is based on the view that in its present
form the Bill covers the illegitimate child. I speak subject to what the learned Attorney-General may say, but I think "child" means legitimate child and nothing else. Therefore, the defence of the Clause which the hon. Gentleman has just delivered is founded on misconception. The only reason why, I think, the Amendment ought not perhaps to be accepted is, that it introduces new matter where there is no confusion, because "child" means a legitimate child. If, on the other hand, there is some doubt which the Amendment would clear away, there seems to be no reason why it should not be accepted.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman say that an illegitimate child is not a child in law?

Sir G. HURST: That is so.

2.23 p.m.

Mr. GRIMSTON: I do not know whether the House would like to have the views of the promoter of the Bill on this Amendment, but he has gone away to refresh himself, and, in his absence, I think that I can give them to the House. Following on what the last hon. and learned Member has said, the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) are that the word "child" in the Bill means a legitimate child, but that if the House sees fit to add the word "legitimate," it makes not the slightest difference, and he is quite prepared to accept the Amendment.

2.24 p.m.

Mr. LECKIE: I am not in a position to speak on the legal definition of the word "child," and I would have liked the advice of the Attorney-General on the subject, because it is a purely legal question. The discussion has raised a similar question in my mind as to what is the position of an adopted child under the Bill. In view of the greatly increased number of children legally adopted, I am wondering whether they will automatically be excluded from the provisions of the Bill.

Sir G. HURST: That point is dealt with at the end of Clause 6.

Mr. LECKIE: Thank you.

Question put, "That the word 'legitimate' be there inserted in the Bill."

The House proceeded to a Division—

There being no Members willing to act as Tellers for the Ayes, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER declared that the Noes had it.

Mr. ANNESLEY SOMERVILLE: I beg to move, in page 1, line 16, at the end, to insert:
Provided that in the case of a child no such provision shall continue after such child has attained the age of twenty-five years or married, whichever event shall first happen.
This Amendment is moved in the interests of the initiative of the younger generation. There was a case recently where a self-made man who had made a very large amount of money by his own exertions and had used it well thought the best thing that he could do for his family was to give them a thoroughly good training and then to make them dependent on their own exertions. A large number of parents feel like that, and undoubtedly when a provision of that sort is made it has a bracing effect on the family. Take the case of a man who has plenty of ability but a tendency to laziness. The father feels that the abilities of his son will be best developed by the son knowing that he has to depend on his own exertions. Consequently, he makes provision in his will for the son to be provided for to a certain age, and that then he has to depend on his own efforts. Under the terms of the Bill the son would be provided for for life, and the object of the Amendment is to provide that it will not be necessary for the courts to make provision after the age of 25.

2.29 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I beg to second the Amendment.
This is a very wise provision. Up till now the rule has been that a father knew best and was able to do his best for his children. The circumstances which have been adumbrated by the mover of the Amendment are perfectly correct. It is a familiar thing that mental capacity is often accompanied by a disinclination for hard work. That is why we so often find Labour leaders in this House—men of great mental capacity. There is nothing worse for a young man than to have great possessions. Nothing does a man any good in this life except what he makes for himself. The other is a burden
and tends to paralyse his initiative. I question whether the age of 25 laid down in the Amendment is old enough; the tendency is to raise the age of compulsory education and it will take a child a longer time to recover from it and have sufficient capacity and industry to work for himself. Mrs. Humphrey Ward, who was a great and able lady of the last generation, said that it took a young man five years to get the better of an Oxford career. Perhaps one of the promoters of the Bill will tell us how long it takes to get the better of a Cambridge career.

Sir J. WITHERS: They never get the better of it.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: It is an absurd thing to think that grown men should look to an inheritance instead of depending on their own efforts. I will not say so much about the women, who may have been brought up unfitted to fend for themselves and may not be clothed with a husband, as the saying is; but a great big fellow of 25 years of age ought to be able to fend for himself instead of waiting for the old man to pass out in order that he may inherit his money. I remember that Pullman, the inventor of the Pullman car and a multi-millionaire of the United States, who left untold millions, had two sons of whom he thought very little. He left them comparatively small annuities to give them a chance of subsistence, but not much more, because, he said, he had had the opportunity of studying these young men far longer than anybody else, and he knew there was nothing more likely to bring them to disaster and sorrow than that they should have put into their hands the vast millions which he had amassed. So he took the whole community of the United States to his bosom and adopted them and made them all his children, legitimate and illegitimate. He left his vast fortune for the general benefit of the American citizens, because he thought his two sons would make bad use of it. They had evidently been some of the "boys" in their young days and had never settled down.
This attitude is quite understandable. It is difficult for a man with money left to him to settle down to anything serious, and it is more difficult in the United States than here. I know some respectable young millionaires, though not a great many, and the tendency is to
wander on to the broad road. The greatest stimulus is for a man to realise that he has to make his own way in the world. I therefore think this Amendment pretty well meets the situation. There may be cases of children suffering from sickness or chronic disease and incapacity and the Amendment might be moderated to some extent so that such children should not become a charge on the community. That may be wholly unnecessary, however, because I cannot imagine any parent who would be so worthless as to operate complete disinheritance of a helpless child. Therefore I think it is quite unnecessary, but it is more in the public interest, and in the interest of the so-called beneficiaries themselves, that after the age of 25 these alimentary and eleemosynary claims should end. I have no belief in endowing what, in many cases, may be a bunch of prodigal sons.

2.35 p.m.

Mr. MORGAN JONES: I venture to think the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not do better than read the observations of the hon. and learned Member for Argyllshire (Mr. Macquisten) on the subject of inheritance.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: He will have nothing to inherit.

Mr. JONES: Perhaps not, after a Labour Government have been in office for some time. I think in the closing observations which he made the hon. and learned Member did point to a flaw in this Amendment. I should agree with the general proposition he laid down in his observations, but as the Amendment stands I think it is capable of doing some injustice to individuals. Let us assume, as sometimes unfortunately happens, that a son or daughter over the age of 25 is permanently incapacitated physically or mentally, or perhaps both. This Amendment, if unaltered, would deprive such a one of the benefit of inheritance, and I think that would be a very gross injustice, because if my deduction is correct the only consequence would be that such a person, being mentally or physically defective, would inevitably become a burden on the community. Obviously the hon. and learned Gentleman would not wish that to happen.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: Would the Mover of the Amendment be prepared to accept a proviso to that effect?

Mr. A. SOMERVILLE: Yes, I am quite ready to accept such a modification.

2.38 p.m.

Sir J. WARDLAW.-MILNE: I must tell the Committee that I am unable to accept the Amendment. The whole position taken up by the promoters of the Bill, a position which is in accordance with the views of the Joint Committee, has been that in legislation of this kind we must leave such matters as these to the discretion of the courts. If once we begin to fetter the discretion of the judge in the way suggested in this Amendment it is obvious that we shall have to give consideration to all sorts of suggestions which hon. Members can put forward, many of them, no doubt, very necessary and wise in their way, and instruct the judge what he has to do under all those various circumstances. The alternative to that is to leave the court free to decide each case on its merits, and that is what this Bill proposes. I am sorry to have to repeat it, but I must ask the House to have regard to the fact that the Committee decided that the only proper and reasonable way of dealing with this matter was to leave the whole thing to the discretion of the court; and in the sub-Clause which we shall come to shortly—if we ever reach it—the House will see that the court has been given the fullest discretion to deal with every case which will come before it, taking everything into consideration—every possible source of income and every other matter which can be brought before it.
It is perfectly true—there is no use in denying it—that there may be circumstances in the past history of a family of which the court will never have cognisance, but that is a risk that must be run. No one puts this forward as a perfect piece of legislation; all we can do is to deal with the average case, and in the average case there would be applicants who would hope to receive some benefit and others who would oppose those applicants, and therefore it is probable that every conceivable circumstance which can be brought forward will come to the attention of the court, and then the judge must decide on the facts before him at the time and also taking into consideration even the circumstances which existed between the parties. That is a very wide discretion.
The House must make up its mind whether it is prepared to give that discretion, in which case an Amendment of this kind is really quite unnecessary, or whether we are to have a different type of Bill in which we go into every possible circumstance that may arise and instruct the court what to do in every circumstance. I submit that it is quite useless to insert these words unless we are going to change the whole character of the Bill.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I suggest that we might except cases of permanent disability. Does the hon. Gentleman say that the court will take into consideration the case of young men of 22, 23, 24 or 25?

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: Certainly, why not?

2.41 p.m.

Sir J. WITHERS: A misapprehension has arisen from the fact that the hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. A. Somerville) has been under the impression that maintenance meant maintenance for life. It does not mean that at all. The whole matter is left to the Judge. The whole idea of the Bill is to leave it to the Judge to decide. It would be open to the House to say that it would not agree to provision being made for anybody over the age of 21, but that has nothing to do with the Bill. I think the idea which prompted the hon. Member to put forward this Amendment was that it was a provision for life, and in that he is mistaken.

2.42 p.m.

Miss RATHBONE: I wish to say a few words against this Amendment. Either we must give discretion to the judge in all cases or in no cases. May I remind those who support this Amendment of one type of case? There may be elderly daughters who have given, perhaps, their whole lives to looking after a parent and then, when it is far too late for them to go into the labour market, they are thrown on their own resources. The Amendment would work very hardly in such cases. I so much sympathise with the view of the proposer of the Amendment that two years ago, when I introduced a Bill roughly on the Scottish lines, I expressly limited the operation of it to the surviving spouse
and minor children, but afterwards I received letters which showed that in that form it would shut out some very hard cases, and that is why I did not feel so disappointed as I might otherwise have done when the Joint Select Committee refused a form of Bill based on the Scottish system and recommended the form that we are now introducing. We have already been discussing this Measure for two-and-three-quarter hours and have only one-and-a-quarter hours left. I know that a good many of those who are prolonging the discussion will not be too sorry if they succeed in talking the Bill out.

HON. MEMBERS: Order!

Viscountess ASTOR: Quite true.

Miss RATHBONE: I think they might feel differently if they could read some of the letters which I and the promoter of the Bill have received while it has been under discussion. They are really heartrending letters, from people who have suffered cruelty under the present law. They come not only from people who have already been disinherited and thrown into poverty after a lifetime given to the service of their husbands and children, but also from people who are suffering in advance, because of thoroughly bad husbands. Such do exist, though they are only a tiny minority. Such thoroughly bad husbands hold the power of inheritence like a sword over the unfortunate wife's head.
If hon. Members could only study in detail the cases of hardship that arise in the present state of the law, I cannot think that they would take the matter as lightly as they do. They could not feel that it was a good joke to leave wretched people to struggle like trapped rabbits in a snare, uttering their pitiful little cries in the hope that somebody will hear them and that legislation will be brought about in time to rescue them. There are many cases of elderly women who have brought up families and have worked hard all their lives helping their husbands to build up businesses. The husband perhaps has taken a mistress or has grown senile, or, because of some whim or caprice, has left the woman absolutely destitute, perhaps dependent only upon the poor law. One case which recently came to my knowledge was that of a woman who, after struggling hard
to help her husband to get a medical education and living happily for several years, was separated and obtained a maintenance order. She was given the highest rate under the order that could possibly be given, and then the man died leaving a fortune of several thousands of pounds which he had amassed in his medical practice. The woman is dependent on the Poor Law and lives with her old father, who has no resources except his old age pension. There are many other cases such as that, and they are looking to this House for assistance. I beg hon. Members not to obstruct this Bill, but to allow it to have a Third Reading.

2.47 p.m.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL: There is a great deal in what has been said by the hon. Lady the Member for the English Universities (Miss Rathbone) as to the daughter who has given a good many years of her life to the support of her father, but that does not carry her argument very far, because she overlooks the fact that very often a niece has shown equal devotion. It may even sometimes be true of an unmarried mother. All those people will come under the Bill. The hon. Lady over-emphasised her case, and it will not assist the Bill if she charges hon. Members with joking about a very difficult matter. I remember that she was a member of a Select Committee and helped to destroy her own offspring when she brought in a Bill in another Parliament. Although this Bill may have many faults, to accept the principle of it is not to exclude people over 25 years of age. I will not follow the hon. Lady's example by making a Second Reading speech, because that might have a damaging effect upon the prospects of the Bill.

2.48 p.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: I trust the House will not accept the Amendment even in a modified form. If it were carried, even in the modified form—

Captain CROOKSHANK: What is the modified form?

Mr. DAVIES: The modified form is, I understand:
Provided that in the case of a child no such provision shall continue after such child has attained the age of twenty-five years or married, whichever event shall first
happen, unless such child is totally incapacitated.
It was something of that kind. If it were carried, it would debar some children, and in some cases all children, from making any claim. If all the children of the testator were over 25 years of age or were married, they would have no claim at all. I believe that that is wrong in principle.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: You cannot go wrong in principle now.

Mr. DAVIES: My hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Morgan Jones) said exactly what I said in the early part of the Debate. If we had a properly ordered society the problems which are to be dealt with by the Bill ought never to arise. I intended to reply to the hon. Gentleman who suggested that the hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. A. Somerville) would not have moved this Amendment if he had not been under the impression that payments would continue for life. The court could, in fact, decide that payments should continue for life. There is no doubt about that. The Bill will do a great deal of good in removing hardship, but I am not so sure, looking at the Bill as a layman, that the people who are doing wrong to their families now would not still find a way of doing wrong, in spite of the Bill. Despite what was said by the hon. Lady the Member for the English Universities (Miss Rathbone), I can imagine no law which we can pass that will prevent a man doing a dirty trick on his family.

2.52 p.m.

Mr. MAITLAND: I apologise to the House for not being in my place when the Amendment was called, although I have been in attendance throughout most of the Debate. May I remind the hon. Lady the Member for the combined Universities (Miss Rathbone) that on Second Reading the Bill passed through the House without discussion. I have very carefully read the Debates which took place in the Committee, and I am sure, speaking for myself and for the hon. friends with whom I have been associated, that we have not acted in any spirit of destructive criticism but with the sole object of improving the provisions of the Bill. The Bill is in many respects much inferior to that which the hon. Lady
introduced some time ago. The principle embodied in this Amendment was in the hon. Lady's Bill, but I have been more generous in the limits which have been fixed. In her Bill the interests of a child ceased upon the attainment of the age of 23 years or two years after the completion of full-time education whichever came first. We suggest in this case that the interest should cease when the child becomes 25 years of age. Hon. Members have suggested that we should give complete discretion to the court, but is it really the desire of Parliament to provide no guiding principle to the judges upon which they are to work in adjudicating in these matters? This Amendment does not touch the question of the widow who remarries. In the hon. Lady's Bill I believe it was provided that on the remarriage of a widow her interest would cease. Again, the hon. Lady's Bill fixed a limit of £2,000 a year for a widow and £300 a year for a child.
We are asked, as a House of Commons, to give to the courts unlimited power. I should be the last person in the world to make the slightest reflection upon the capacity of our courts to deal with this matter, but I do say that it is part and parcel of our duty to lay down certain principles which should guide the courts and indicate to them the intentions of Parliament. There is a wider issue involved than the mere question whether the interest of the child shall cease at the age of 25, and that is the question whether it is the intention of this House to pass a Bill giving such unlimited power and discretion to the courts without giving any definition or lead to them in regard to the principles which are to guide them in deciding cases which, unquestionably, will be very difficult. I am quite prepared to accept the alteration which has been suggested. I think that the provision in the Bill of the hon. Member for the English Universities related to children who were physically or mentally incapable of self-support. I am quite prepared to accept those exceptions, but I would ask the supporters of the Bill in all seriousness if they have considered its implications, to decide for themselves whether they think it is in accordance with the principles of Parliamentary government that we should hand over such extensive powers to our courts
without indicating to them the kind of principles which we expect them to follow in making their decisions.

Captain CROOKSHANK: May I ask my hon. Friend why he selects the age of 25 rather than 21?

Mr. MAITLAND: That is a contentious subject. I know that 21 has been fixed for all practical purposes as the age of maturity, and I realise that, if a young lady of 21 told me that she was engaged to be married, I should immediately congratulate her, and should not question her wisdom in choosing a husband, though I might hope that she had chosen wisely. But I have a shrewd suspicion in my mind that the age of 25, whether in connection with the choice of a husband or with choice on other important matters, is an appropriate age, and I think that in a matter of this kind it is well to err on the side of generosity. Therefore, the age of 25 has been taken rather than 21.

2.59 p.m.

Mr. BAILEY: The hon. Member for the English Universities (Miss Rathbone) has mentioned to us several cases of hardship, but there is no law under the sun which does not in specific cases produce hardship, and, when you legislate, you have to legislate on general lines and for the good of the whole. The particular hardships which may be involved by testamentary injustices do not apply with nearly so much force to people of the age of 25 who are able-bodied and able to earn their own living. They are just the kind of people who can, if they want to do so, make their own way in the world, and do not need assistance from their parents, unless their parents are willing to give that assistance.
What is attempted by this Bill, and the Amendment would prevent it in the case of children over the age of 25, is the setting up of the Court as a judge of what is a man's duty. In cases connected with family affairs you never get the truth before the court. A son may he a thoroughly bad son without breaking publicly any of the commandments with which the court might be concerned. To-day there is far more danger of parental authority being undermined than of children being unjustly treated. For every hard case in which a child—and especially a child of the age of 25—is left by an
unnatural parent without provision, there are 50 hard cases of children not respecting their parents' wishes where they ought to respect them. In my view this House ought to do nothing to make it easier to weaken the tie of parental authority. I should regard it as a great argument against bringing a child into the world if the parent's power to influence him for good was nullified by his being able to say that his parent should have no influence over him unless he was prepared to wash all his dirty linen in public. Look at the number of men of 25 who fall in love with a pair of pretty eyes or a pair of pretty ankles, and whom the wisdom of their fathers prevents—

Viscountess ASTOR: What do you mean?

Mr. BAILEY: I mean nothing. I mean what I say. [Laughter.]

Viscountess ASTOR: Agreed!

Mr. BAILEY: I agree with the Noble Lady that, in replying to interjections from her, it is very unwise to raise controversial matters. I have made my point. It is simply that a father can very often exercise the best possible judgment in preventing his son from doing something foolish if he has the financial argument in the background. If that authority is taken away, one knows quite well that in actual practice, when these matters come to be administered, there will be, as in the case of separation orders in the police court, a compromise every time. You can practically never tell in a police court whether the wife or the husband is in the right. Each side comes along and blackguards the other, and the court nearly always makes a compromise Order. In this case also it would mean that practically any son who wanted to break away from his father's authority, unless he went absolutely wild, could do it.
We ought not to allow the courts to meddle in our family affairs. For the most part hitherto in this country we have kept our family affairs out of the courts, and I hope we shall never do anything in any other direction which would merely be the thin end of the wedge. Let us look at this matter as a whole, leaving rhetoric aside. I represent an industrial Division, where I move among the people
a great deal, and I never hear of a case where a father or mother has treated a child badly. I find that their relations as a whole are perfectly friendly and proper. Cases in which you find that a father has treated his children badly are quite exceptional, and, if you legislate for such exceptional cases, you are likely to break down what is the best bond of family life—the privacy between father and son and between man and wife.

3.4 p.m.

Mr. SPENS: Although personally I agree with very much of what the last speaker has said, I would like to bring the House back to the Amendment. My own view is that it is quite impossible to lay down in detail in the House of Commons the conditions which should be observed by the courts in administering the provisions of this Bill if it becomes law. After even a few moments' consideration of the Amendment as it stands on the Paper, someone picked a hole in it, and I am certain that those of us who have to spend our lives in assisting the judges to administer discretionary provisions would be able to put on paper within three-quarters of an hour half-a-dozen other conditions which ought to be embodied if we are going to confine the discretion of the judges at all. It is impossible for this or any other assembly to provide beforehand for all the particular circumstances which are going to arise in each individual family case. Subsection (1) of the Clause provides that the Orders which are to be made by the court in these cases are to be subject to such conditions and restrictions as the court thinks fit. It is true that, as the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) said, Clause 1, as it is worded at present, might be held to mean that the court could only make one Order, which would have to go on for all time. That point has already been noticed, and I have no doubt at all that, if the Bill becomes law, temporary Orders will be made which can be varied to meet all the circumstances as they arise.
I ask the House, if they are going to accept the general principle of the Bill of putting into the hands of Chancery judges, and possibly county court judges, the discretionary powers in the first Clause of the Bill, that they will do so realising that every time they make an order they will be taking away from some
beneficiary what the testator has left to that beneficiary. Bred up, as they all have been in the belief that that is the very last thing that any judge ought to be asked to do, I am certain that they will administer this discretion very jealously indeed in favour of the beneficiary, and I do not believe anyone need fear for a moment that in making their orders they will lean unfairly against the beneficiary and too generously towards the applicant. I believe that the lines on which they will administer the discretion will be simply to give what is absolutely necessary to maintain the applicant who has been improperly provided for and nothing further. I ask the House to reject the Amendment and to trust the judges to administer this discretion that it is placing on them.

3.8 p.m.

Mr. GALBRAITH: My name is down as one of the supporters of the Amendment, and I hope the proposer will take it to a division. I believe it raises most important questions of principle, as regards which the House must take its own course. By this Bill we are enabling the courts in cases where provision has not been made for wife or children, to take away from the persons to whom the testator has given it the property which be has thought fit to bequeath to them. That being so, I think the principle that we ought to try to put into the Bill is that the abrogation of property ought not to be given affect to more than

absolutely necessary to carry out what we want to carry out by the Bill.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: On a point of Order. Ought a Member of the House to be reading a newspaper?

Mr. GALBRAITH: The hon. Member for the Combined Universities (Miss Rathbone), when she brought in her Measure in 1931, said its object was that where a surviving spouse and children were left almost destitute, power ought to be given to go to the court, That being so, ought not the House to lay down certain rules and principles to guide the discretion that the courts have to exercise? I would be the last person to suggest that the discretion that we give them will not be exercised in the fairest and most trustworthy way, but, after all we have a responsibility in the matter. If some of the arguments which have been put forward on the other side are to be given effect to, we might just as well say that, in a case where a testator has not made reasonable provision for his wife or children, the judges of the Chancery Division should decide what is right to be done. That is very largely what the Bill comes to unless we put in some regulations to guide the court, and it is because I strongly hold that to be desirable that I ask the House to accept the Amendment.

Question put, "That those words be there inserted in the Bill".

The House divided: Ayes, 46; Noes, 78.

Division No. 223.]
AYES.
[3.11 p.m.


Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick Wolfe
Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Nunn, William


Attleo, Clement Richard
Hanley, Dennis A.
Palmer, Francis Noel


Bailey, Eric Alfred George
Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Pike, Cecil F.


Blaker, Sir Reginald
Joel, Dudley J. Barnato
Procter, Major Henry Adam


Broadbent, Colonel John
Lovat-Fraser, James Alexander
Raikes, Henry V. A. M.


Brocklebank, C. E. R.
McKeag, William
Reid, William Allan (Derby)


Cadogan, Hon. Edward
Macmillan, Maurice Harold
Rickards, George William


Castlereagh, Viscount
Macquisten, Frederick Alexander
Ropner, Colonel L.


Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)
Magnay, Thomas
Rutherford, John (Edmonton)


Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)
Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
Savery, Samuel Servington


Denman, Hon. R. D.
Meller, Sir Richard James
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.


Drummond-Wolff, H. M. C.
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)
Touche, Gordon Cosmo


Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
Morrison, William Shephard
Turton, Robert Hugh


Greene, William P. C.
Moss, Captain H. J.
Ward, Lt.-Col. Sir A. L. (Hull)


Groves, Thomas E.
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.



Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
North, Edward T.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—




Mr. Somerville and Mr. Maitland.


NOES.


Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)
Barnays, Robert
Copeland, Ida


Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)
Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry


Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.
Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.


Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)
Cape, Thomas
Crooke, J. Smedley


Banfield, John William
Carver, Major William H.
Daggar, George


Batey, Joseph
Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Davies, Rhys John (Westhoughton)


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)
Clayton, Sir Christopher
Denville, Alfred


Despencer-Robertson, Major J. A. F.
Leckie, J. A.
Sandeman, Sir A. N. Stewart


Dickie, John P.
Lees-Jones, John
Simmonds, Oliver Edwin


Dobbie, William
Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Spens, William Patrick


Edwards, Charles
Lindsay, Kenneth (Kilmarnock)
Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart


Entwistle, Cyril Fullard
Locker-Lampion, Com. O. (H'ndsw'th)
Tate, Mavis Constance


Essenhigh, Reginald Clara
Lunn, William
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles


Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)
McEntee, Valentine L.
Thorns, William James


Fuller, Captain A. G.
McKie, John Hamilton
Tinker, John Joseph


Goldie, Noel B.
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Todd, A. L. S. (Kingswinford)


Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Maxton, James
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


Hamilton, Sir George (Ilford)
Moore, Lt.-Col. Thomas C. R. (Ayr)
Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.


Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)
Watt, Captain George Steven H.


Holdsworth, Herbert
O'Donovan, Dr. William James
Whiteside, Borras Noel H.


Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Penny, Sir George
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.
Radford, E. A.
Wilmot, John


Jackson, J. C. (Heywood & Radcliffe)
Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)
Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)


James, Wing.-Com. A. W. H.
Rathbone, Eleanor
Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)


Johnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)
Ron, Walter Russell



Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Ross, Ronald D.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Kerr, Hamilton W.
Runge, Norah Cecil
Sir John Withers and Captain Ramsay.

3.20 p.m.

Mr. MAITLAND: I beg to move, in page 1, line 19, after "source," to insert "and,".
When this matter came before the Committee there were only two speeches in regard to it, one an explanation by the Attorney-General and the other an acceptance of it by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne). The point that I had in mind in putting down the Amendment was to bring to the notice of the House the rather wide roving commission that is suggested by the procedure here adopted. On reflection, I am not quite certain that this is an Amendment that I feel disposed to press to a Division, but I think it is worth while bringing to the notice of the House what is proposed. It is proposed that if any application is made for the purposes of Clause 1 (1):
The court shall, on any application made under this Act, have regard to any present or future income of the applicant from any source.
No one can reasonably object to that.
The second matter about which the court is to make inquiry is the conduct of the applicant in relation to the testator. My purpose in putting down my Amendments is rather to make an inquiry from the Attorney-General as to the third matter in the Clause and to ask whether it is intended that all matters which may be quite extraneous to the dispute shall be brought before the court. It is quite right and proper to inquire into the present or future income of the person who is seeking for provision to be made for him, it is quite right and proper that inquiry should be made as to the conduct and relationship which existed between the testator and himself,
but I am not quite certain that it is right that questions which have no relation whatever to these personal matters should be discussed and brought before the court on an issue of this kind. I am seeking information rather than laying down any dogmatic opinion as to whether it is right to include the words which my later Amendment proposes to delete.

3.22 p.m.

Mr. GALBRAITH: I beg to second the Amendment.
I hope hon. Members will look at the extraordinarily wide words in Subsection (2). In the first place, these are things which the court which must apparently take into account in deciding whether or not provision should be made for the maintenance of a spouse or child, not provided for by the testator's will.
The court shall, on any application made under this Act, have regard to any present or future income of the applicant from any source, to the conduct of the applicant in relation to the testator or otherwise, and to any other matter or thing which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant or material in relation to the applicant.
It is most important and proper that the court should take into account the means of the applicant and the conduct of the applicant in regard to the testator, but why should it be relevant to inquire whether many years before the applicant had been guilty of something which was disgraceful or shameful? This can have no bearing on the question as to whether proper provision has been made for him by the testator and seems to be going too far.

3.23 p.m.

Mr. HERBERT WILLIAMS: I hope that the promoters of the Bill will reject
the proposal. It would narrow improperly the matters which the court should take into account. As it stands, they can take into account the conduct of the applicant in relation to the testator, but if the words suggested are left out they would not be able to take into account the conduct of the testator, when he was alive, to the applicant. That would be shut out, and also the court would be excluded from taking into account how the applicant is to live. Although they are to have regard to any present or future income it might happen that the applicant received nothing and that his only mode of maintenance was to make application to the Poor Law guardians. An income received from the Poor Law guardians would not be received as "present or future income" for the purpose of this Sub-section. Therefore, if these words are left out the court would not be able to take into account how the applicant is to maintain himself or herself.
I am considering the case where he or she is not in a position to work and has no other means. In that case he or she would fall on the Poor Law. Although I am one of those who doubt the way the Bill has been drafted, I see no reason why people should bring children into the world and when those people die expect the ratepayers to keep their survivors. After all that is the plain logic of it; those who deny that there is need for any legislation are saying that in some circumstances people who are parents have no responsibility for their children when the parents are gone, and that the children have to be maintained by the ratepayers. If the opponents of the Bill have these words deleted the court would be debarred from considering at all who is to maintain an applicant.

3.27 p.m.

Mr. LOVAT-FRASER: When the hon. Lady the Member for the combined English Universities (Miss Rathbone) introduced her Bill in 1931, I was very glad to vote for it. It was based on the provisions of the Scottish law, which in turn is based on the Roman law. That Bill seemed to me to reflect the precision and the logical character of Scottish and Roman law. I am entirely in favour of the principle behind this Bill, entirely in
sympathy with her aim in relieving the cases of distress of which she gave us such a pathetic account to-day. But my desire to promote that object does not shut my eyes to the character of the Bill. This Bill, in striking contrast to the Bill of 1931, is illogical and unsound.

Mr. SPEAKER: I must remind the hon. Member that we are now dealing with an Amendment and not with the whole Bill.

Mr. LOVAT-FRASER: I was coming to the Amendment. One of the worst features of the Bill is this particular Clause. I support the Amendment. The language of the Clause to my mind is vague and unsatisfactory to the last degree:
any other matter or thing which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant or material in relation to the applicant.

Mr. McKIE: Does the hon. Member not think that the court could be trusted to realise what those words mean?

Mr. LOVAT-FRASER: The words are far too wide and they put far too much on the court.

3.29 p.m.

Sir J. WARD LAW-MILNE: Again, it is extremely difficult for me to do more than repeat in somewhat different language what I have already said to the House. I quite agree that in many ways it would be more desirable to have a Bill that introduced some form of Roman or Scottish law. No one who knew my origin would expect me to suggest that that would not be a better system. But what hon. Members seem to forget is that that matter has already been considered for a long period and decided by a Joint Select Committee of both Houses. It is as the result of the recommendation of that Committee that this Bill has been introduced. I do not put it higher than to say that the Joint Select Committee suggested that a Bill on these lines was worthy of the attention of Parliament. They did not go any further than that. But it is forgotten by those who suggest that we ought to have a hard-and-fast rule that that matter has already been considered. There are two distinct schools of thought on the question of whether the powers of the court should be limited
or not. There are those who consider that the court should be limited in all kinds of ways and others who are prepared to accept the view that there should be no limitation at all. The House must decide in which way it wants the Bill to work.
The Standing Committee upstairs came to the definite conclusion, I think unanimously, that the court ought to have complete discretion and that point was also brought out in the evidence before the Joint Select Committee. All these Amendments come back to the point: Are we to give discretion to the court or not? Holding the view that I hold, and in view of what has been said by the Joint Select Committee and the opinion of the Standing Committee upstairs, I can only repeat that the House must decide whether it is going to give the court discretion or not. If it is, then these limiting Amendments must be resisted. In conclusion I wish to make an appeal to hon. Members. Having some experience in these matters I know that there are many genuine opponents of the Bill and some who, perhaps, are not so genuine. [HON. MEMBERS: "Order!"] There is nothing out of order in that statement. Some men may have definite opinions and others may have less definite opinions.

Mr. BAILEY: "Definite" and "genuine" are different words and if the hon. Member will substitute "definite" for "genuine" there can be no complaint.

Sir J. WARDLAW-MILNE: If the hon. Member will show me in a dictionary that there is any difference which affects what I have been saying, I shall be glad to change the word to suit him. This is the only opportunity which this Bill has of getting through. If hon. Members feel that it ought to be passed in its present form I would ask them to allow us to get to the Report stage before four o'clock. If they do not feel strongly that the Bill ought to be thrown out altogether, they ought to allow us to get past this question of the discretion of the courts. All the Amendments which we have discussed for the last couple of hours have borne on that one point, and the House, I think, has already shown its feeling that the court ought to be given full discretion.

3.33 p.m.

Viscountess ASTOR: May I add my voice to that of the hon. Member for
Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) in appealing to hon. Members. We understand that there are some people who do not want this Bill. I ask them to let it go to a Division and to vote against it. That would be the fairest way. This Bill is backed by every women's association in the country and the women constituents of hon. Members feel very keenly about it. Therefore, I would ask them to give us a chance to get it—to vote against it if they will but not to obstruct it.

Mr. PIKE: On a point of order. Has this anything to do with the Amendment?

Mr. SPEAKER: It is a request that the discussion on the Amendment should come to an end.

Viscountess ASTOR: I ask hon. Members to remember the thousands of women who have helped to send them here and who want this Bill. At least be gallant enough to give us a chance of having a decision on the Bill.

3.35 p.m.

Mr. TURTON: I am sure that everybody would agree with the Noble Lady if they were also in entire agreement with her as to the correctness of the provisions of the Bill, but many of us think we should see if the provisions are really satisfactory and, indeed, what the noble Lady herself desires. I am not in agreement with the mover of the Amendment as to all the words that he wants to take out. My hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne) said that we should give the Court a wide discretion. That seems to be one of the things we are not doing by these words. The words to which I object are the two words "or otherwise". The Sub-section is drafted in this form: It says that the court is to have regard to certain matters, and then it says that it may also take into consideration any other matter that it may think relevant. That is an entirely different thing. Why should we have the Chancery Court turned into a court of ancient history inquiring into the private life of every applicant?

Sir J. WITHERS: It is done every day.

Mr. TURTON: I am certain the Chancery Court does not go into the murky past of every applicant.

Sir J. WITHERS: The hon. Member knows very well that in many cases in
Chancery Chambers the past history of persons is gone into in very great detail, and if he will come with me on any Monday morning to the Chancery Division, he can prove what I say.

Mr. TURTON: I agree. I occasionally go into the rather holy portals of the Chancery Court, and I find there some details in regard to the murky past being dealt with, but is that a reason why we should have it in this Bill? If you put in that the court shall have regard to the conduct of everybody else, that is an invitation to whomsoever appears for the other side at once to probe into the past of the applicant, and to make out that the mere fact that he was convicted, say, of being cruel to a dog 30 years ago is a reason why he should not get reasonable maintenance under the Bill. I will go into the Lobby with the hon. Member if he will agree to cut out the words "or otherwise" and leave in the remaining words of the Sub-section. The real point is this, that if you leave these two words in, the Judge will not be able to stop counsel going into something that appears to him quite irrelevant and immaterial about the past conduct of the applicant. If you take those words out, you will leave the Court a wide discretion to allow counsel to argue as they wish, if it is relevant. I ask, in all seriousness, the promoters of this Bill to accept the Amendment in so far as cutting out the words "or otherwise," for I think that they weaken the otherwise excellent Subsection, and I ask the House to reject the rest of the Amendment.

3.41 p.m.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: As I was responsible for introducing the Subsection in this form, I think it is desirable that I should say a word. The Bill, as originally introduced, contained a most unsatisfactory Sub-section to express the intention of the promoters. It was to this effect:
The court may refuse to make an order in favour of any person on any ground which the court thinks sufficient to disentitle him to the benefit of an order.
I did not feel that that would do, and I understood that the purpose of the sponsors of the Bill was to give the court that discretion which they so constantly and wisely exercise in taking into consideration everything which the court
thinks proper. The Clause is drawn with that object, and I venture to think, if I may say so with modesty, that it is a good Clause to carry out that purpose. If the House thinks that the court should be restricted in these matters, it will reject the Clause, but I want the House to understand the precise purpose for which it was drafted, namely, to give the court full and unfettered discretion to determine what it thought necessary to inquire into.

3.42 p.m.

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: The more members of the legal profession try to explain anything in this House, the more difficult it is for me to understand what it all means. It is well, therefore, that a layman should be permitted to say a word or two. My difficulty about the Amendment is that it limits the power of the court to make inquiries, but quite frankly, my trouble with the whole of this problem is that there will be an inquiry made by everybody on behalf of everybody, and everybody interested will be entitled to reply and question, except the one person who ought to be there, and his lips are closed for good. I should have thought that the Attorney-General and the hon. Member promoting this Bill would have told us something about that. The hon. Member for South Croydon (Mr. H. Williams) has left his seat for the moment. I think he has already touched upon the issue.
I say once again that I am definitely in favour of something being done to promote a Bill in this Parliament to deal with the difficulties which have arisen; but if the Government themselves do not undertake the task, I can see no hope of a private Member's Bill achieving the object which we seem all to have in view. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has been good enough to sit all day long listening to the debate, and I think he has helped the Committee very much in trying to shape the Bill; hut, as a layman, I say once again that the more we have tried to amend this Bill the less, it seems to me, it will achieve the objects it has in view. We have not gone through more than half of Clause 1 so far, and I want to tell the promoters of the Bill that, as far as I am concerned, I have not deliberately done anything to prevent the passing of this Measure. I will say, with a little conceit, that I know the way
to do it when it requires to be done, but I have not done it to-day. I want to appeal again to the Attorney-General to note what little progress has been made with the Bill and how difficult it is to pass a law that will achieve the object which everybody seems to have in view; that he will take note of what has happened in the Debate to-day and see if the Government cannot take up this problem and bring forward a Bill that will give Parliament the right to determine what it wants to do with this important issue.

Mr. PIKE: Will the hon. Member pledge himself, in the event of the Government introducing a similar Measure, that he and his friends will support the Government.

Mr. DAVIES: If the Government introduced a similar Measure we would land ourselves exactly where we are now.

3.46 p.m.

Mr. McKEAG: I suggest that the House cannot very well accept the Amendment in view of the previous proceedings to-day. It will be within the recollection of the House that Amendments which were moved by the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. Macmillan) and the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) to Sub-section (1) were considered unnecessary because of the wording of Sub-section (2). If this Amendment be accepted, it will entirely destroy the substance of the case which was put forward for the rejection of the (hon. Member's Amendments. In view of that, I suggest that, having rejected two Amendments because it was understood the words in Sub-section (2) covered the ground, the House should not now accept an Amendment which would entirely destroy the substance of the argument which caused the House to reject the previous Amendments.

3.48 p.m.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: I am sorry that the Noble Lady the Member for the Sutton Division (Viscountess Astor) is not present at the moment, because I wanted to congratulate her on her new views against anything that might be open to the faintest suspicion of obstructive tactics. I remember in a Committee upstairs when the Measure which is down later on the Order Paper—

Mr. SPEAKER: I am afraid that is not the Measure before us now.

Mr. MACQUISTEN: It is to come on soon, and I hope to see the proofs of repentance on that occasion. We are told in this Sub-section that we must give the most unlimited and absolutely omniscient discretion to the judges. Nobody has greater respect for His Majesty's Chancery Judges than I have, but is it fair to unload upon them a discretion and a power that should only be asked of the Almighty? That is what it comes to. How can they judge of the conduct of the applicant in relation to the testator? It strikes me as a task too difficult and unfair to ask them to undertake. The hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. M. Jones) said that the question which would arise was whether a testator should unload the support of his children on to the ratepayers, because somebody had to keep them. All who die without leaving any property might be said to do that, but I do not think they do, for they have given their children a chance in life; but as that problem has appealed to the judicious intelligence of the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. R. Davies) it is possible that it might become a question with the court, and the court in that case might apply a sort of means test. The court might say that the other relatives who were getting the estate were so well off that they could well afford to pay something to the support of this member of the family whose conduct, possibly, had led to his own disinheritance.
The burden of discretion which is thrown upon the court is a very heavy one, and I think it would be better if we limited the scope of the inquiry that will have to be made into these cases. It will be similar to the inquiries which are made into divorce cases or, as the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Withers) has said, into the guardianship of infants. There will be a terrible amount of investigation. Therefore, I think the scope of the investigation might be limited, because if it is not a substantial proportion of the estate will be dissipated in the costs of the proceedings. I have a horror of litigation. I presided yesterday at a meeting where I had to explain to those who appointed me to that position that we had spent £68,000 over litigation, which we had won, and
that we should recover only a portion of that expenditure. It was not our fault, but that of an inveterate aggressor, because we fought the same people 20 years ago and took a very large sum from them then. I was very sorry for all the people concerned, and I am very sorry for all who will be rolled up in the toils of this Measure. It has been well called a "Solicitors' Endowment Bill," because that is what it comes to. The hon. Member for Cambridge University suggests that counsel will benefit too. I have no doubt they will get their share, and so I will include counsel, and call it a "Bill for the Endowment of the Legal Profession," a provision for securing that in one walk of human life there shall be no unemployment. I am averse to extending the inquiries, and think it would be as well to restrict the Clause by limiting the investigation before the judges to the question, Has the prodigal son who is complaining that he has been disinherited done something which really justified the action of the testator in leaving him out? Of course, it may be that the testator's view and the judge's view will differ, and if so we are driven to the position that the judge must be allowed to decide.

3.54 p.m.

Mr. W. S. MORRISON: If we accept the view of the promoters of the Bill that the way to achieve its object is to give the widest discretion to the courts, then the House will do well to reject the Amendment. But those who feel with me some dubiety about the wisdom of charging the courts with this very wide discretion must, I think, support the Amendment. The trouble about these cases in which there is a dispute in a family is that they disclose, frequently, the very reverse of that spirit which obtains in the great majority of families.

All the human kindness which in the ordinary family illumines the life of its members is soured and turned, in these few cases, into a spirit that is the reverse of beneficent and is indeed vindictive. In those circumstances, we are not doing the best service to the judiciary to extend their discretion beyond what is humanly possible. I yield to nobody in my admiration of His Majesty's judges, but I do not think that we are doing the right thing in praising their omniscience and fairness and at the same time unloading upon them a discretion which it would be very difficult for any human being to exercise.

The older I get the more difficult I find it accurately to judge the motives of human conduct. Very often actions that appear to be of a disgraceful nature, upon wider knowledge only make one excuse them and find justification for them. I can see the point quite well of asking Judges to look at the relations of the person with the testator; that is a very proper thing if you permit the courts to interfere in testamentary dispositions, but to enlarge it, as this Bill does, is to make the Judges inquire into matters not of law and not actually of fact, but to make them psychologists of an abstruse character, gifted with powers of mind which very few people of this earth have of accurately weighing up the motives that characterise that strange thing which we call human conduct. For those reasons, while I agree with the logical case of the promoters of the Bill, to give a wide discretion to the Judges, I submit that in this ease it is too wide, and that we ought to limit it in the way that has been suggested.

Question put, "That the word 'and' be there inserted in the Bill."

The House divided: Ayes, 33; Noes, 90.

Division No. 224.]
AYES.
[3.58 p.m.


Astbury, Lieut.-Com. Frederick Wolfe
Galbraith, James Francis Wallace
Raikes, Henry V. A. M.


Bailey, Eric Alfred George
Greene, William P. C.
Reid, William Allan (Darby)


Blaker, Sir Reginald
Hanley, Dennis A.
Rickards, George William


Broadbent, Colonel John
Harvey, Major S. E. (Devon, Totnes)
Rutherford, John (Edmonton)


Brocklebank, C. E. R.
Joel, Dudley J. Barnato
Savery, Samuel Servington


Buchan-Hepburn, P. G. T.
Macquisten, Frederick Alexander
Simmonds, Oliver Edwin


Cadogan, Hon. Edward
Molson, A. Hugh Elsdale
Somerville, Annesley A. (Windsor)


Cochrane, Commander Hon. A. D.
Moss, Captain H. J.
Southby, Commander Archibald R. J.


Crookshank, Capt. H. C. (Gainsb'ro)
North, Edward T.
Touche, Gordon Cosmo


Davies, Maj. Geo. F. (Somerset, Yeovil)
Palmer, Francis Noel



Davison, Sir William Henry
Pike, Cecil F.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES.—


Denman, Hon. R. D.
Procter, Major Henry Adam
Mr. Maitland and Mr. W. S. Morrison.


NOES.


Adams, D. M. (Poplar, South)
Agnew, Lieut.-Com. P. G.
Banfield, John William


Adams, Samuel Vyvyan T. (Leeds, W.)
Astor, Viscountess (Plymouth, Sutton)
Batey, Joseph


Beaumont, Hon. R. E. B. (Portsm'th, C.)
Hunter, Dr. Joseph (Dumfries)
Ramsay, T. B. W. (Western Isles)


Bernays, Robert
Inskip, Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas W. H.
Rathbone, Eleanor


Brown, Ernest (Leith)
Jackson, J. C. (Heywood & Radcliffe)
Rea, Walter Russell


Cape, Thomas
Johnstone, Harcourt (S. Shields)
Remer, John R.


Carver, Major William H.
Jones, Sir G. W. H. (Stoke Now'gton)
Ropner, Colonel L.


Castlereagh, Viscount
Jones, Morgan (Caerphilly)
Runge, Norah Cecil


Cazalet, Thelma (Islington, E.)
Kerr, Hamilton W.
Sandeman, sir A. N. Stewart


Clayton, Sir Christopher
Lamb, Sir Joseph Quinton
Sinclair, Col. T. (Queen's Unv., Belfast)


Copeland, Ida
Leckie, J. A.
Spens, William Patrick


Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry
Leighton, Major B. E. P.
Sugden, Sir Wilfrid Hart


Croft, Brigadier-General Sir H.
Lindsay, Kenneth (Kilmarnock)
Tate, Mavis Constance


Daggar, George
Llewellin, Major John J.
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. H. (Derby)


Denville, Alfred
Lockwood, John C. (Hackney, C.)
Thomas, James P. L. (Hereford)


Dickie, John P.
Lunn, William
Thomson, Sir Frederick Charles


Dobbie, William
McEntee, Valentine L.
Thorne, William James


Drummond-Wolff, H. M. C.
McKeag, William
Tinker, John Joseph


Edwards, Charles
McKie, John Hamilton
Turton, Robert Hugh


Evans, R. T. (Carmarthen)
Magnay, Thomas
Wardlaw-Milne, Sir John S.


Fuller, Captain A. G.
Margesson, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. D. R.
Warrender, Sir Victor A. G.


Goff, Sir Park
Maxton, James
Watt, Captain George Steven H.


Goldie, Noel B.
Mayhew, Lieut.-Colonel John
West, F. R.


Grenfell, David Rees (Glamorgan)
Mills, Sir Frederick (Leyton, E.)
Whiteside, Borras Noel H.


Groves, Thomas E.
Moore, Lt.-Col. Thomas C. R. (Ayr)
Williams, Herbert G. (Croydon, S.)


Hacking, Rt. Hon. Douglas H.
Moreing, Adrian C.
Wilmot, John


Hannon, Patrick Joseph Henry
Morrison, G. A. (Scottish Univer'ties)
Wood, Sir Murdoch McKenzie (Banff)


Holdsworth, Herbert
Nation, Brigadier-General J. J. H.
Young, Ernest J. (Middlesbrough, E.)


Hope, Capt. Hon. A. O. J. (Aston)
Penny, Sir George



Hudson, Capt. A. U. M. (Hackney, N.)
Pownall, Sir Assheton
TELLERS FOR THE NOES.—


Hume, Sir George Hopwood
Radford, E. A.
Sir John Withers and Mr. Grimston.

It being after Four of the Clock, and objection being taken to further Proceedings, further consideration of the Bill, as amended, stood adjourned.

Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be further considered upon Friday next.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

ADJOURNMENT.

Whereupon Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 2.

Adjourned at Six Minutes after Four o'Clock until Monday next, 30th April.